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Foreword 
 
In the last quarter of calendar year 2004, the author of this paper carried out an 
exercise to determine the evolution of the global economy and politics. This resulted in 
an ICRIER working paper.  As part of this exercise it was necessary to examine the past 
growth performance of China’s economy more carefully and closely and resulted in a 
policy paper.  Since then the author has refined and furthered the research on the global 
economy  and  polity  in  several  ICRIER  Working  papers.    The  current  paper  is  the 
culmination of a similar refinement of the earlier policy paper on the Lessons of China’s 
growth  experience  for  non-socialist  countries.    The  focus  of  the  paper  is  on  past 
economic growth, its determinants and the identification of policies that can be adopted 
by other countries to accelerate economic growth.   
 
There are of course negative lessons that can be learned from China, things to 
avoid doing.  Several of these are mentioned as potential weaknesses or as negative side 
of  positive  policies,  but  they  are  not  presented  explicitly  as  (negative)  lessons.    The 
paper’s focus is on successful Chinese policies that can be emulated by  others to an 
extent (within certain bounds) that are mentioned by the author.  The author is not trying 
to draw lessons for China itself on what policies it should correct or how China can do 
better in future, though some of these emerge as by products. 
Issues  relating  to  non-economic  factors  such  as  human  rights  and  democratic 
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1  INTRODUCTION
* 
Through the 1990s China was widely and often held up as a paragon of economic 
policy reform driven growth and an example for others to follow.  We in India were not 
immune to the temptation to do the same.  There is no doubt that China has lessons that 
India and many other countries can learn, lessons that will help improve their growth rate. 
Some of these lessons have been correctly learned, for instance those related to the export 
led growth model adopted by many S. E. Asian and E Asian countries.   There is however 
a  great  danger  of  learning  wrong  lessons,    This  danger  arises  from  the  fact  that 
information can and is controlled much more easily in a communist party ruled State than 
it is in a democracy, even a flawed one.  China has also gone out of the way to make 
economic  interaction  with  it  (e.g.  FDI,  outsourcing  of  manufacturing)  profitable  for 
foreigners (non-Chinese), so their interests are best served by publicising information that 
ensures that profitable interaction with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State 
continue. 
The present paper is an attempt to derive a more balanced picture of China’s past 
success so that better and more fruitful lessons can be drawn for the use of other non-
communist countries.  In this context the economic history of India, characterised as it is 
by 30 years of Indian Socialism can be quite beneficial as it comes closest to the market 
based “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.  In contrast comparisons of China with 
Soviet socialism (USSR) can be very misleading and those with Cuba or North Korea are 
deliberate red herrings.  With the exception of the degree of external openness (FDI & 
foreign trade), China’s economy in 2005 is still much more ‘socialist’ than India’s was in 
the heyday of the Indian Version of socialism. 
 
                                                            
* I would like to thank Dr. Surjit S Bhalla , Oliver Mueller,  Prof Madhu Bhalla, Prof Ashok Guha, Abid Hussain, Dr. Swaran Singh, 
Dr. Ashok Parthasarthi, Pradeep Baijal, Neela Mukherjee, Maj Gen (retd) D Banerjee and T R Manohararan for  their  comments on 
earlier versions of this paper and Gurnain K  Pasricha for excellent research assistance.  
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2  OVERVIEW 
In the late 1930s Oskar Lange put forward the idea of “Market Socialism,” an 
economy in which assets (means of production) were owned socially (by the communist 
party  or  State),  but  which  mimicked  the  supply-demand  price  adjustment  of  the 
competitive  market  economy.    Aba  Lerner,  Lange  and  others  then  debated  this  issue 
during the 1930s.  The key element that is common to ‘market socialism’ a la Lange and 
Lerner  and  ‘Socialism’  (a  la  Lenin  and  Stalin)  is  socialist  (i.e.  party)  ownership  and 
(managerial) control of assets.  The key difference is market based allocation of goods 
and services versus centrally planned allocation of goods and services.   
In  China,  the  ‘market’  element  has  expanded  gradually  since  the  start  of  the 
agricultural reforms in 1979
1 and the introduction of Urban reforms in 1984. In 1992 
China  publicly  stated  that  its  goal  is  a  “socialist  market  economy  with  Chinese 
Characteristics.”  Though  China  has  successfully  expanded  the  scope  of  the  market, 
“socialist” (communist) control of factors remains very important. An understanding of 
these elements is essential to an understanding of the economic performance of China.
2  
The paper starts by giving a stylised version of China’s economy in terms of the mix of 
socialist and market elements.  This leads to an explanation of the growth performance of 
the  Chinese  economy  and  appropriate  lessons  for  other  countries,  particularly  non-
socialist ones. 
The  primary  “market”  economy  is  in  products  (goods  &  non-infrastructure 
services) where even CCP controlled enterprises compete to maximise growth, as in a 
private  corporate  economy.    The  other  market  elements  are  external  capital  (100% 
foreign invested enterprises and Joint Ventures) and external trade. Exports and FDI have 
played such an important role in China’s economy that its growth has been characterised 
as  ‘Export-led  growth,’  and  could  since  1990  be  characterised  as  ‘FDI-export  led 
growth.’  The extent to which import trade is now free is not entirely clear, though on 
balance this could be put into the market category.  There is also a competitive fringe of 
individual capitalists/private capital that operates in export production. 
                                                            
1 After the third plenum in December 1978. 
2 The reforms that China is currently undertaking or plans in future, have no relevance to past performance.  The focus of the paper is 
on industry so early agriculture reforms are not discussed.  
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The  socialist  planning  system  still  operates,  however,  in  factor  markets  (land, 
labour,  capital)  and  infrastructure  and  the  pricing  of  these  inputs  is  used  to  provide 
(indirect) subsidies to foreign investors and domestic exporters. Cities/Provinces can and 
do price land to any buyer at any price.  The labour responsibility system determines 
where person can work legally and where it cannot.   The banking system has evolved 
little  from  a  government  department  where  loans  are  decided  on  the  basis  of 
provincial/national objectives and ability to repay is irrelevant (variable cost of capital).
3 
Infrastructure pricing and supply (particularly to foreign invested enterprises) is similarly 
decided on the basis of national/ provincial/ city objectives and can vary with enterprise. 
This is also true to some extent for the output of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
which remain subject to central department (their bosses) orders and directions.  
In moving from the “Socialist” to the “Socialist Market” Economy, China has 
borrowed  aspects  from  the  “Nationalist  Market  Economies”  of  developing  Japan,  S. 
Korea and Singapore.  The primary objective of the latter government’s was to catch-up 
with  the  advanced  countries  through  fast  growth  of  average  income.    They  therefore 
developed  a  national  consensus  to  maximise  GDP  growth.      The  whole  nation  was 
mobilised to achieve this goal.  The simplicity  of this objective (growth, investment, 
production) made it much easier to decentralise it and ensure accountability at every level 
including  that  of  the  private  corporate  sector  (Zaibatsu,  Chaebol).    Democratic 
accountability was however stronger in these countries, so that much greater attention 
had  to  be  paid  to  democratisation  of  the  gains  from  growth,  and  the  welfare  of  all 
citizens.
4   
Both types of economies contrast with ‘democratic market’ economies like India 
that are driven primarily by democratic concerns in which the multidimensional nature of 
Welfare  maps  into  multiple,  often  contradictory,  objectives.    The  means  adopted  to 
achieve  one  objective  often  contradict  those  required  to  achieve  another  resulting  in 
cross-cutting actions.  Multiple objectives lead to diffusion of accountability and provide 
                                                            
3 For SOEs it varies downward from the formal rate to zero.  The implicit interest rate could be negative if partial repayment is 
expected.  For non-SOEs it varies upward from the formal rate for SOEs plus 20%. 
4 Even though in theory we can always devise a set of assumptions that shows Welfare maximisation and 
growth maximisation as equivalent, we are talking about the effect of adopting and trying to implement the 
two approaches in the real world (outcome).   
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liberal scope for pursuing ones personal goals (agency problems) as failure to achieve 
any one objective can always be blamed on the need to ensure another.  
3  SOCILIST ELEMENTS 
3.1  LENINIST PARTY 
 
The standard Marxist-Leninist description of the Communist ruled State is the 
“Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”  In China as in other communist/socialist states this 
means the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
5  To paraphrase Perkins 
(1994), ‘All political power in China is monopolised by the Chinese Communist party, a 
party that is organised along Leninist lines. Power is centralised at the top and not easily 
challenged  from  below.’  The  party  is  a  hierarchy  stretching  from  the  party  general 
secretary at the top to the party honcho in the smallest settlement/village.  The objectives, 
broad  approach  to  achievement  of  these  objectives  and  the  parameters  within  which 
lower levels can take initiatives, is decided at the top.  Within this framework there is a 
multilevel  decision  making  process  from  the  national  to  provincial,  Metro  cities  and 
Town & Village level. 
3.1.1  Decentralisation of Socialist Production
6 
This decentralisation is not a post-1978 development but has evolved since the 
1960s, with the decentralisation of planning authority first to the provinces and then to 
the county.  To paraphrase Perkins (1988), “By the 1970’s a large proportion of Chinese 
enterprises were under the authority of the provinces rather than Beijing.  In most cases, 
particularly with large enterprises and strategic sectors, Beijing retained effective control 
even if planning formally was at the provincial level.”
7  ‘The Collectively owned and the 
Township and Village Enterprises (which were then called the Commune and Brigade 
Enterprises) accounted for 22% of industrial production in 1978, where the ownership 
                                                            
5 The only reasonable political benchmark is the former USSR/Soviet Union.  North Korea is a personal 
dictatorship, not a party (proletariot) dictatorship.  Similarly Cuba is better described as a kind of Feudal or 
virtual dictatorship. Even though Castro is the unchallenged dictator of Cuba, his stature in the party, rather 
than use of terror, ensures that nobody challenges him (i.e. he is a virtual dictator).  Therefore to say that 
China is far removed from North Korea and cannot therefore be called a ‘dictatorship’ is a red herring. 
6 The discussion also draws on Shirk (1985), Jin and Qian (1998), Che and Qian (1998), Smyth (1998), Oi 
(1995), Putterman (1995), and Mood (2005).  
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rights  over  such  enterprises  resided  not  with  the  community  but  with  the  local 
government’ (Walder (1995)). 
Evidence is provided in Wong (1985) that local governments (provincial levels 
and below) in addition to having gained greater autonomy over allocation of materials 
from the Center during the Cultural Revolution, were also to a large extent able to bypass 
the material allocations of the central plans by setting up local enterprises with local 
funds.    The  level  of  Central  government  control  fluctuated  from  then  onwards,  but 
decreased during the Cultural Revolution. Some materials which had been under direct 
allocation  by  the  State  Planning  Commission  or  by  the  Central  ministries  were  now 
allowed  to  be  locally  allocated.  In  1966,  “almost  all  output  from  local  small  scale 
industries” came to be under local allocation. These small scale industries included iron 
and  steel,  cement,  chemical  fertilizers,  coal  and  farm  machinery  and  therefore,  this 
decentralization was not trivial to increasing local government’s ability in making and 
implementing investment decisions. Each level of local government invested in its own 
enterprises decentralized to their control even if the profits from these enterprises was not 
formally available to them. 
The immediate effect of Chinese Communist Party campaigns such as the “Great 
Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution” were clearly highly destructive in many 
ways.  These campaigns were however a training ground for a unique communist party 
structure that was highly centralised in that the party at all levels had to implement the 
policy orders emanating from the leadership of the party (and anybody who dared oppose 
the Mao set objectives of these campaigns came to a horrible end).  It was also highly 
decentralised in its implementation and operation in that party cadres had to use their own 
initiative  in  finding  (reallocating)  financial  resources,  obtaining  the  capital  goods  for 
setting  up  furnaces  and  finding  the  raw  materials  for  producing  steel.    Even  the  red 
guards  had  a  lot  of  freedom  in  defining  the  ‘Capitalist  Roaders’  and  inventing  re-
education  campaigns  and  punishments  for  them.    The  Maoist  period  of  socialist 
experimentation, though harsh and destructive, established an experimental approach to 
Party and State action.  In our view this experimentation and experience has been an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 In fact decentralization of industry was carried to an unsustainable extreme under Mao, with the setting up 
of thousands of steel furnaces in the villages of China.  
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important  foundation  for  converting  party  cadres  and  State  employees  (often 
indistinguishable) into public entrepreneurs. 
3.1.2  The Party Core 
The party has undoubtedly changed and evolved over the last 25 years and is 
different from what it was under Chairman Mao.  But it is also very different from any 
ruling party in a genuine democracy or ‘quasi-democratic’ State.  For instance one of the 
most important departments of the party is the personal department.  This department (at 
different levels) vets and selects all official appointees to positions with decision-making 
authority
8  and  every  CEO  of  every  government  owned/controlled  company/  firm/ 
organisation.    These  appointees  are  therefore  not  just  state  officials  or  company  /co-
operative CEOs, but part of the network of the Chinese Communist party.  Even if the 
CEO  is  not  a  party  member  there  will  be  a  party  member  (or  group  of  members) 
ostensibly junior(s) in the organisation who can over rule him on ‘ideological’ grounds.
9   
Other vital departments of the Chinese Communist Party are the ideology and 
propaganda  departments.    The  management  of  information  is  one  of  the  important 
responsibilities of the party and its senior leadership.  Democratic country citizens’ too 
readily forget that the communist state has to ensure that its citizens believe, decade after 
decade, that every thing the party does is for their good. Good chits from foreign business 
partners are also helpful in this endeavour, so it is important to ensure that foreigners 
believe the party line.  In any case, positive expectations among foreigners is essential for 
maximising FDI, exports and investment all of which are critical to the attainment of 
Party (CCP) objectives.   
China is not immune to the deterioration in governance that is seen in many non-
OECD countries, particularly those that try to control economic activity.  The systems of 
government and party are therefore fraying as in these countries, leading to increased 
corruption.  The lack of control arising from the general deterioration in governance can 
easily be confused with a deliberate decision to reduce, dismantle or eliminate the control 
                                                            
8 Equivalent to our Joint secretary and above. 
9 The Chairman of one of the poicy banks in China, complained in an interview in the Financial times that 
all his decisions were reviewed every month by a committee whose members included party officials with 
little or no expertise in financial matters.  
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network,  given  the  level  of  transparency  regarding  internal  working  of  Chinese 
Communist Party. 
3.1.3  Post-1980 Financial Incentives 
The  degree  of  operational  freedom  and  flexibility  within  the  designed  and 
designated sphere of operation of the lower levels has however, increased since 1980. 
The most important impact of the post-Mao period reforms was to increase the financial 
incentives of the local governments to promote investment in their regions - as not only 
the means to hedge against shortages under planned quotas, but as a means to increase 
local  revenue  (and  hence  the  bonuses  and  perks  they  could  award  themselves),  local 
employment and incomes (including those of their family and friends, through control 
over local enterprises). The three reforms that are considered in the literature to have 
been the most important in this change of incentives were: 
a)  Enterprises were now to be taxed at fixed rates, leaving all residual profits with 
them 
b)  Each level of government now had to pay a fixed amount out of taxes collected 
from enterprises under its jurisdiction to the next higher level. 
c)  The  introduction  of  Household  responsibility  system  gave  the  households  the 
right to income from sale of above-quota produce, making it necessary for the 
township and village governments to look for other sources of income.  
 
Within the overall structure of decentralisation the degree of autonomy and nature 
of accountability for managers of organizations and enterprises can vary from province to 
province, from township (village) to township (village) within the same province.  Thus 
appointment of the CEO by the party/govt can go along with a relatively high degree of 
operational autonomy for the CEO in a production firm.
10  For instance, the town or 
village  CCP  boss  who  appoints  the  T&V  enterprise  CEO  could  leaves  him  free  to 
maximise  the  growth  of  the  firm  subject  to  specified  obligations  to  the  village/town 
administration (e.g. local purchase or hiring) and/or the local party boss. Similarly the 
CEO  of  a  joint  Venture  may  be  free  to  pursue  a  growth/sales  maximisation  strategy 
subject to either promoting exports (with any losses covered by State loans i.e. disguised 
as NPAs) or below cost supply of intermediates to an FDI investor to attract it to that 
area.  On the other hand, the professional CEO of an investment company or bank, may 
                                                            
10 But not in the financial sector where the party/govt still controls capital flows.  
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have  limited  market  autonomy,  with  most  of  his  decisions  vetted  or  reviewed  by  a 
committee of party members (formally junior to him in his and other organisations).
 11 
 China’s governance system is therefore a mix of centralised and decentralised 
elements, bearing little resemblance to Stalinist USSR. 
3.2  FACTOR MARKETS 
The socialist control over factor markets is pervasive, compared to any ‘democratic 
market economy,’ though it may appear liberal relative to the former USSR or Mao’s 
China.   This includes the Land, Labour and Capital Markets. 
3.2.1  LAND 
All land is owned and controlled by the State. Because of the historical legacy of 
cooperative ownership of farmland, the system is slightly different in the rural areas.  In 
many provinces farming households ostensibly have an ownership share in village and 
farm land, but loose this right if they move to the urban areas to work.  Brandt et. al. 
(2002) examine the realities of land rights and tenure security, over a decade after China 
introduced  reforms  and  de-collectivized  agriculture.  They  find  that  although  the 
allocations were supposed to be for 15 years, which was increased to 30 years in late 
1990’s, only 28% of the villages in the survey had seen no reallocation of land since 1983 
and in the rest of the cases the reallocation decision was never made by the households 
concerned. Most of the reallocation decisions were made at the village level, and a small 
percentage  at  the  township  level,  and  in  almost  half  of  the  villages,  the  date  of 
reallocation hadn’t been announced in advance. Not only are the household not entitled to 
own land they cultivate or to have a say in the change of their holdings, they also do not 
get any compensation for investments in land improvement that they might have made on 
the land transferred away. Although 71.6% of the villages reported that their households 
were free to transfer land use rights to other households, which is a short term contract in 
the nature of land rental, called Zhuanbao, only 3% of the land was actually rented out in 
1995. 
 Many Urban municipalities in Market economies own urban land that is normally 
acquired rural land on the outskirts of a city for conversion into urban land.  They have, 
                                                            
11 Indian public sector managers have always enjoyed this type of freedom.  This does not mean that we can  
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however, to operate within a system of zoning laws, rules and procedures.  In a socialist 
economy land use can be changed overnight at the stroke of a pen.  To whom, at what 
price and for what purpose the land is given, can vary with category of the person/firm.  
For instance, the acquisition of new land for industry involved complex negotiations with 
suburban communities or townships in which it gives up part of its land in exchange for 
guaranteed jobs for some of its members (Perkins(1988)).   Buying and selling of long 
term leases was allowed in urban areas in the 1990s, but the process of acquisition of 
rural land for factory purposes remained unchanged.  It is however very important to 
remember the positive discrimination in favour foreign invested enterprises.  The fact that 
such  enterprises  have  been  legally  allowed  to  trade  leased  land  does  not  mean  that 
domestic  private  enterprises  or  individuals  (as  against  ‘socialist  owned/  controlled 
enterprises) have the same rights.  Further even if formal legal rights have been given the 
situation in practice may be quite different (worse) for the (genuine) domestic private 
sector than it is for FD investors. 
Citizens can be evicted from the land if the CCP/government decides to rebuild an 
urban area or build a new township on rural land.
12  Till mid-2005 there was no formal 
system of government registration of the ownership rights of households over apartments. 
Thus the second owner of an apartment does not have the legal right to mortgage it to a 
commercial  bank  and  get  a  loan,  despite  the  fact  that  the  original/first  owner  of  the 
apartment may have had mortgaged the apartment to get a loan.  The latter is the result of 
a cosy deal between the urban authorities, the developer and the bank, that cannot be 
repeated for the resale because the urban authorities are no longer involved and have 
nothing to gain from winking at the ‘law’ (the so called owner has no legal right to sell 
i.e. has only userfruct rights)  
The urban authorities can also price the land to suit their purpose.  It can therefore be 
reduced  to  a  fraction  or  nil  for  a  100%  foreign  invested  firm  that  brings  in  skills 
technology or products that are thought desirable or one that commits to export part or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
arbitrarily classify the Indian Public sector or the TVEs as private. 
12 30 million people have had their land taken over by property developers since 1994.  According to Gao 
Zhi Sheng a public interest lawyer, a majority of Chinese judges are members of the CCP and therefore 
ensure that its objectives are fulfilled.  
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whole of its output.  It can similarly be reduced for a real-estate developer who shares 
part of the profit with the urban authorities. 
The rapid development of coastal cities and their absorption of such villages has left 
an interesting anomaly in places such as Shenzen.  There is a rich ‘village’ in the middle 
of Shenzen that is owned collectively by the households that lived there and farmed the 
land more than three decades ago when it was a real village collective.  Currently it looks 




In every Communist country the party controlled the labour unions and therefore the 
terms and conditions of work.  This is also true in China and therefore the overall policy 
approach to terms & conditions of employment, work hours and wages is decided by the 
CCP (at an appropriate geographical level or level of government).  If the CCP decides to 
apply different work and pay rules in a particular province, sector, industry or type of 
enterprise  (e.g.  foreign  invested)  from  those  applied  to  general  domestic  enterprises, 
neither the (so called) labour unions nor the employees can do anything about it.  They 
can either like it or lump it.  
In addition, in China the labour market is also controlled through the Hukou system 
that determines where a person is entitled to live and work and receive State provided 
social benefits.  If people move without formal CCP permission they are in effect illegal 
migrants  with  no  rights.    Chinese  government’s  restrictions  on  rural-urban  mobility 
primarily operate through the Hukou system – a system of household registration, which 
establishes a person’s place of legal residence (where a child’s residence is established 
initially at the mother’s place of legal residence).   Legal residence in an area entitles one 
to access public schooling and healthcare, housing and job opportunities and/or land for 
farming. Legal change of residence is possible if either a person  succeeds in getting a 
place at a senior middle school and then at a city college by clearing competitive exams 
for the same, or if the state allows it, say allowing firms in a city to hire permanent 
workers from nearby rural areas. A worker may live legally in an urban area, without 
                                                            
13 Presumably because that is the only way in which urban land can be owned by these citizens.  It is 
therefore a show case of the “private ownership” and development of land in urban areas.  
14 The discussion also draws on World Bank (2005), Au and Henderson (2002), Whally and Zhang (2004) 
and Hertel and Zhai (2004).  
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acquiring an urban hukou as a permanent resident on a long term permit or as a contract 
worker. Permits for legal residence are neither easy nor cheap to come by, and illegal 
migration has been increasing throughout the reform period.  
Surplus labour in rural areas (due to underemployment) was estimated to be about 
100 mi of which the ‘floating population’ of illegal migrants from rural to urban areas 
constituted ‘tens of millions’ (Perkins (1994)). Total rural to urban migrants in China 
were estimated to be about 76 million in 2000 and total number of migrants around 131 
million. In 1999, 16.87 million migrants were legally allowed to migrate to counties other 
than  their  home  counties.  Though  the  figures  aren’t  directly  comparable,  being  for 
different years and the 16.87 million includes both rural urban and other migration, but 
they give a rough idea about the extent of illegal migration.  A variety of factors ensure 
that  illegal  migrants  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  get  employment  in  better  paying 
industries, among them local governments’ pressure on enterprises to give employment to 
local residents. And there is always the risk of deportation.  
When the special economic zones were first opened, all labour contracts were with a 
Chinese labour bureau (CCP controlled) that effectively controlled terms and conditions 
of employment.  Later when the demand for unskilled labour exceeded the local labour 
pool, people were brought in from neighbouring areas and by this act given (temporary) 
legal right to live and work in that Special Economic Zone. If every unskilled labourer 
was expected to work 100 hours a week 52 weeks a year in the SEZ, the new migrants 
would “voluntarily” even “happily” do so.  There was no other option to earn that kind of 
annual wage in their own place of legal residence and the legal right to work/live in the 
SEZ could and was easily revoked if (s)he was not willing to accept the rules decreed by 
the CCP.  If FDI investors were willing to produce and export labour intensive goods if a 
docile pool of unskilled labour willing to work day and night, was available, this was 
ensured by the local party bosses.  The extreme restrictions on labour have undoubtedly 
eased over time, but likely remain stricter than in any market economy (or one that claims 
to be a “market” economy).  
Formally labour is allowed to work for 76 hours a week of which 40 is normal and 
36 overtime.  Reports suggest that 100 hours a week (at normal wages or piece rates) is  
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not uncommon in labour intensive units producing for export.
15  This ironically results in 
a reduction in per hour productivity below what it would be if working hours were the 
same as in State Owned Enterprises. 
Some steps towards reform of the hukou system have been taken in recent years. In 
2001, the Ministry of Public Security reduced the minimum requirements to be eligible 
for hukou in small towns and cities to the applicant having a permanent source of income 
and  legal  housing  in  the  locality.  And  in  some  medium  and  large  cities,  such 
requirements have been reduced to having a work contract of specified duration, say 
more than 2 years. It is now illegal to charge migrants’ children extra school fees and in 
early  2004,  fees  for  temporary  resident  permits  in  urban  areas  were  eliminated.  
Nevertheless,  legal  migration  remains  difficult,  Central  directives  are  subject  to  local 
implementation or the lack thereof.   
In a survey by the World Bank and the Development Research Center (DRC) of the 
State  Council  in  2003  of  3156  enterprises  in  all  31  provinces,  60  to  70  percent  of 
enterprises considered labour market distortions arising out of hukou status - whether due 
to direct pressure on enterprises to employ local residents and not to employ migrants for 
certain jobs and positions (Beijing specified 100 such occupations in 2000) or due to 
inability of local governments to provide pension, medical, unemployment benefits to 
migrants  and  education  to  their  children  –  as  serious  or  very  serious  protectionist 
practices affecting their region or industry.
16 
3.2.3  CAPITAL 
3.2.3.1  Socialist Enterprises 
 
In 1980 100% of capital assets were owned and controlled by the State/CCP.  The 
management of these assets was (is) distributed to different levels of government, which 
in turn was (is) controlled by different levels of the party.  Some were (are) controlled at 
the  National  level  through  the  departments  of  the  central  government  and  their  CCP 
bosses.  Others are managed/ controlled at the provincial, City and Village level (village 
                                                            
15 As an increasing number of western companies have made commitments to stake holders to enforce labor standards in their overseas 
production units and suppliers, records are falsified and labor coached to provide the ‘right’ answers to visiting social auditors. 
16 Apparently illegal migrants are henceforth to be allowed to use certain urban social services like schools 
for enrolling their children.  
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co-operatives,  T&V  enterprises).  All  industrial  enterprises  (now  SOEs)  were  what  in 
Indian parlance would be called Departmental Public enterprise.  Some of these industrial 
enterprises have been converted into (what in India we call) Public Sector Units (PSUs), 
i.e. companies that may or may not be listed on the stock exchange.  In China the listing 
could also be (solely) on the Hong Kong stock exchange or even a foreign exchange.  
This does not convert them into private enterprises as management control remains with 
the same CCP boss or his nominee/appointee.
17 
Similarly, Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs), though (in theory) collectively 
owned by the workers, are subject to local govt. direction (Perkins(1988, 1994)).
18  This 
would in practice mean that the CEO is appointed by the local party boss/ government 
and works under his supervision / direction within the operational autonomy given by the 
latter.    It  would  be  an  extremely  foolhardy  T&V  manager  who  could  ignore  the 
objectives  and  guidelines  set  down  by  the  local  party  boss/govt!    However,  party 
appointed managers have a sphere of autonomy assigned by the CCP/govt within which 
they run the firm and compete in a market environment.  Thus managers of county firms 
may  maximise  value  added,  so  that  they  can  increase  the  benefits  (wages,  perks, 
employment  of  children)  to  enterprise  employees.    This  would  result  in  competitive 
behaviour in input/ output markets.
19  As long term value added maximisation is the same 
as  growth  maximisation,  the  conflict  between  local  and  national  goals  is  minimised. 
Fierce competition in product markets (both inputs and output side) is also consistent 
with party appointed management, given the growth objective. 
China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) can be formally owned/ managed by the 
national, provincial or municipal governments.  Listed companies are largely national or 
provincial SOEs as even collective enterprises were not allowed to raise capital on these 
exchanges till 1997.
20  TVEs are classified as non-state sector, but often this is mistaken 
as private sector.
21  TVEs are SOEs controlled by the lowest level of government with a 
                                                            
17 In India, the Tata’s exercised absolute control over TELCO & TISCO with 6-8% of the share holding till the mid-nineties. 
18 The township was basically the old commune which carried out both production and government functions.  Even in (so called) 
‘individual private’ enterprises started by workers or managers, the local govt would invariably play a role and have a share in their 
earnings. 
19 Competition can however be thwarted by local/ provincial protective barriers to trade. 
20 Regional stock exchange on which the latter raised capital were abolished in 1995. Listing quotas were abolished in 2000. 
21The correct picture as painted for instance by Gelb and Byrd(1990) and Perkins (1988, 1994) seems to have been lost along the way.  
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greater  degree  of  autonomy  in  terms  of  market  operation.
22    However,  Township 
governments  own  and  operate  township  enterprises  and  Village  enterprises  have 
substantial and numerous ties to village government. Village committees perform govt. 
functions but village officials are not civil servants.   
Urban collective enterprises can be wholly owned subsidiaries of SOEs or township 
promoted or hived off units.
23  Thus they have organic links to government.  By way of 
comparison, co-operatives in India, operate under explicit rules and regulations and can 
be termed as private, even in those cases in which their dependence on government funds, 
makes them vulnerable to government interference.
24 
We call these corporate enterprises together as socialist enterprises.  Kuijs (2005) 
has shown that these enterprises are not required to pay any dividends to the government 
and consequently have 100% reinvestment of profits.  Kuijs (2005) also shows that the 
exceptionally high saving rate of China is due solely to the high saving and investment by 
the enterprise sector, while the household and government saving rate and the latter’s 
investment rate is in line with other Asian economies.  
Institutional Reform 
Limited  reforms  in  ownership  and  operational  flexibility  led  to  remarkable 
improvements in output and productivity was SOEs. Xu (1997) estimates that that the 
labour productivity of these enterprises grew at the rate of 2.6% per annum during the 
period 1980-89. Among the reforms were: 
a)  Increasing marginal profit retention rates, on average from 11% in 1980 to 27% in 
1989 (though these retained profits were subject to many constraints over use). 
b)  Granting firms greater autonomy over 6 main productions decisions – value and 
quantity of output, type of product, technology and scheduling of production, and 
exports.  
c)  Contract responsibility system, which granted managers the legal right and some 
discretion to operate the firm for the contracted period. 88% of the firms in the 
sample had a CRS contract in 1989, while almost none did in the beginning of the 
sample period.  
d)  Granting managers some discretion over exact wages paid to the employees. 
                                                            
22 According to Huang(2003), the revenue objectives of the local officials are much more closely aligned with the profit maximisation 
objectives of the enterprise as both depend on income maximisation, in contrast to higher levels where many macro objectives come 
into play and dilute autonomy and accountability (pp 140, 127, 106). 
23 With the township contributing old machinery from existing township production unit but legally owning the entire enterprise even 
it is subsequently nurtured/built-up by the managers with their own funds. 
24 They have a choice not to get funds from the govt. If they choose to become dependent on govt funds then they have to abide by the 
conditions imposed on provision of these funds.  
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e)  Increasing management turnover, though any arbitrary increase in management 
turnover cannot per se be considered a reform, but in so far as it might have made 
managers more accountable, this may influence firm performance. 
 
Li (1997) finds a marked improvement in the marginal products of labour and 
capital in the 1980’s, with the former increasing by 54% between the pre and post 1985 
periods. There were also efficiency gains due to reallocation of labour – though how this 
might have come about is uncertain, as labour allocations continued to be controlled by 
local governments and layoffs were virtually prohibited. One possible explanation is that 
the ownership rights that the local governments won over SOEs in the 1980’s could have 
induced  them  to  allocate  labour  more  efficiently.  Another  lies  in  the  rights  given  to 
enterprises to set up collectives to place their redundant workers.  
3.2.3.2  Banks 
The household savings rate has fluctuated between 16% and 22% of GDP during 
the  nineties.    Because  the  share  of  household  income  in  GDP  is  very  low  in  China, 
household saving rates out of disposable income were quite high in the mid-nineties.  
They are now (2000) around 24% of disposable income or 15.5% of GDP (Kuijs (2005)).  
Investment by households, largely residential, is estimated by Kuijs at 5-6% in 2003.  
The remaining household savings ranging from 9% to 12% of GDP are transferred to the 
banking system. 
 The  Policy  Banks  and  Commercial  Banks  are  100%  owned  by  the  national 
government  while  the  Regional  banks  are  owned  by  local  governments,  State  owned 
enterprises or Business Federations (govt controlled).
25  Till 1998 there was a formal 
lending  quota  system  operated  by  the  central  bank  for  SOEs.    The  only  financial 
intermediary  that  could  be  called  private,  the  Urban  Credit  Cooperatives  (UCC)  was 
compelled to hand over a majority of shares to the municipal governments in 1995.
26 Up 
to 1998 only the Urban and Rural credit cooperatives, whose deposit base was limited to 
the non-state firms were allowed to lend to private firms.  
In the Communist State, capital has no price or cost.  Even in Socialist China, 
banks are not intermediaries but instruments of the State (departments) for channelling 
                                                            
25 Minsheng Bank is owned by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce a govt organization overseeing private firms. 
26 Huang(2003), pp118.  
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capital  into  desirable  activities.    According  to  Perkins  (1994),  “Though  formally 
commercial banks were separated from the Central bank early in the reform period, in 
reality they follow the direction of the central bank and of the government policy makers 
in  general.”  Below  market  interest  rates  are  standard  (Perkins  (1988,  1994)).    More 
important, capital costs can vary by borrower (in the same category) among borrowers of 
different categories in the same industry, place and time.  Interest rates on loans to non-
state firms (ie non-SOEs) have to be equal to or greater than the rate of interest to SOEs 
plus 20%.  
According to official figures non-performing assets (NPA) for the four commercial 
Banks were 25% in 1998 of which 20% were loss assets.  NPA’s constituted 30% of 
GDP.
27   NPA has no meaning for loans to SOEs, because credit is given if it is needed to 
maintain an activity or organisation that has an assigned role in the economy.  In other 
words if partial or no repayment is expected when the loan is made it is a misnomer to 
call it an NPA later when the expected happens (in this situation full repayment is a low 
probability  event  and  therefore  unexpected).    The  repeated  capitalisation  of  China’s 
“banks” shows that this description is not far from the truth, for a large share of loans.
28  
Such bailouts since the Asian crises aggregate to between 50% and 100% of GDP. 
  This stylised picture for the entire period till 2004 should not be taken to mean 
that there are is no liberalisation/market reform over time or that truly market oriented 
lending  based  on  technical  criterion  is  nil  in  2004.    The  extent  of  such  lending  is 
however, very hard to know accurately and is likely be a much smaller fraction of the 
total than is assumed by CV (conventional wisdom).  Further sale of some shares to 
foreign  banks  or  the  public  will  not  dilute  CCP  (management)  control  of  these 
commercial banks in any way.
29  It will merely result in transfer of technology and skills 
to the bank for them to use within the circumscribed autonomy authorised by the CCP, 
perhaps with a gradually expanded scope for market lending over the next few decades. 
                                                            
27 See Lardy (1998) for a detailed discussion of NPAs. 
28 A Mckinzie journal volume on China (2004) gives just of hint of this. 
29 A recent (2005) report in the Financial Times quoted the Chairman of one of the Commercial Banks 
complaining about how all his decisions were subject to review (and were reviewed monthly) by a 
committee consisting of party cadres holding mid-level positions in the financial system.  
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3.2.4  TECHNOLOGY & IPR 
Realising the extent of its industrial backwardness in 1979, China did not hesitate 
to send thousands of students to the US and the West to close the gap in education and 
skills.  Most of these early students were the children and kin of party officials who could 
be trusted to collect as much information and knowledge and bring it back for socialist 
dissemination.  Even later a large fraction of students was connected to CCP. 
Technology as a factor is largely part of the socialist system (collective ownership).  
There is no genuine market for technology in socialist China in the sense that individual 
buyers and sellers of technology can transact among themselves.  In the socialist system, 
if  any  government  firm  acquires  technology  from  abroad  either  through  purchase  or 
through a joint venture with a foreign firm, that technology could be disseminated to 
every government firm that needs it.
30  Reverse engineering where feasible would also be 
viewed as part of the natural right.  Even in the case of ostensibly private firms such 
acquired technology may be transferred to others. 
China has partly avoided the pitfalls of stagnating commercial technology that was 
one of the factors in the falling behind/collapse of the USSR, by allowing relatively free 
import of capital goods (embodied technology) and welcoming FDI. FDI helps avoids 
stagnant or negative technical change in the civil economy (i.e all non-strategic areas) 
that characterised the last decade of the USSR.  China has also tried to undertake research 
in new scientific areas with some success.  The output of Chinese scientists as measured 
by the citation index increased rapidly to respectable levels. 
Increased pressure on China not to allow the widespread use of Western registered 
brand names and openly violate copyright and patent rights is likely to increase over 
time.  In our view, this will have the effect of reducing the violation of IPRs on consumer 
goods where the violation is blatant and visible.  It will have little effect (for decades) on 
the way IPRs on capital goods and intermediate products are regarded/treated within the 
socialist owned enterprises.  
                                                            
30 A research oriented company in each industry may be selected to import, adapt, modify and develop technology for that industry 
and then disseminate it to all SOEs in that industry.  This perhaps includes reverse engineering of imported capital goods.  
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3.3  INFRASTRUCTURE 
As  in  many  developing  countries  a  large  part  of  China’s  basic  physical 
infrastructure is owned by the State.  Other countries also control prices and implicitly 
cross-subsidise  certain  categories  of  users  such  as  low  and  lower  middle-income 
consumers.  Some do the opposite by setting lower rates for industry.  China, however, 
has the ability to tailor supply, including the supply price, to the individual user to meet 
other objectives such as exports or FDI. Thus for instance a distribution line could be laid 
or a road constructed to a new FDI investor’s location if this is necessary to attract it.  
Utility prices could be similarly changed to suit any requirement if that helps meet an 
objective.    There  is  no  incentive  for  the  receiver  of  this  munificence  to  disclose  or 
publicise such hidden subsidies, because they could just as easily be withdrawn. 
4  MARKET ELEMENTS 
4.1  PRODUCT MARKET 
 
The  most  important  market  innovation  that  China  introduced  into  its  socialist 
economy was the product market.  In 1979 it started with agriculture output markets.  
Initially agriculture markets were partially liberalised in a manner similar to that used in 
India  for  sugar  and  other  markets  in  the  sixties.    This  was  a  ‘Dual  pricing  and 
distribution’ system in which part of the produce continued to be handed over to the 
government at a controlled price, while the rest could be sold freely at the market price. 
 Many  of  the  rules  circumscribing  small-scale  service  activities  were  also 
abolished  or  ignored,  resulting  in  a  boom  in  collectively  and  individually  owned 
restaurants  and  shops.  Labour  contracting  services  also  developed  in  the  interior 
provinces to supply construction workers to urban areas.  
Dual pricing in industrial goods was introduced by China in 1985-86, with prices 
on the market channel allowed to fluctuate according to market conditions.
31  At this 
point, more than half of all industrial goods were still distributed at administered prices. 
Product liberalisation was gradually extended to the entire manufacturing sector.  It has 
also been selectively extended to the real estate sector and retail trade. 
                                                            
31 ‘low level government officials did extract informal payments of various kinds’ Perkins(1994).  
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Domestic  markets  are  however  far  from  perfect,  particularly  for  goods  and 
services that were produced and traded at the county level and at the province level (to a 
smaller  extent).    As  the  county/province  owns  the  local/provincial  firms  there  is  a 
tendency to modify regulations to favour local production and create protective barriers 
against import of competitive goods from other counties/provinces.  This tendency will 
be least in cities and provinces whose CCP bosses are part of the central party leadership 
and therefore more interested in national growth.  Further the collective enterprises that 
constitute  the  most  competitive  firms  are  limited  in  their  physical  reach  by  capital, 
transport and other constraints.  Inter-provincial market integration has increased from 
very low to moderate levels. 
4.2  INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
4.2.1  FOREIGN TRADE 
In  the  early  years  external  trade  was  carried  out  largely  by  State  trading 
companies  and  Provincial  trading  companies  and  by  1993  there  were  4000  such 
government  controlled  foreign  trade  companies.  External  trade  can  now  be  taken  as 
largely  market  based  even  though  the  system  retains  a  strong  bias  against  imports; 
Though policy biases against imports by domestic firms have been gradually removed 
government and managers have an asymmetric attitude to exports and imports.  In 1979, 
reforms were introduced to facilitate exports of manufactures and (for the first time) to 
allow for foreign investment (Lardy 1992). Special Economic Zones (export processing 
zones) were set up to free foreign investors and other exporters from red tape. Input tax 
offsets and export subsidies were introduced. The currency was devalued from 1.7 yuan 
per US dollar in 1981 to 2.9 yuan per USD in 1985.   Though exports grew rapidly from 
1977 onwards, imports remained tightly controlled till the mid-1980s (Perkins(1988)). 
4.2.2  EXCHANGE RATE 
In early 1980s foreign exchange was tightly controlled by the Bank of China even 
for  foreign  investors  who  needed  to  repatriate  profit  or  import  inputs  for  export.  To 
attract export oriented FDI from Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese, government 
created  ‘foreign  exchange  adjustment  centers’  or  swap  markets  on  which  those  with 
surplus foreign exchange (e.g. joint venture hotels) could sell their surplus FE to foreign  
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firms at market determined rates.  The establishment of these centers effectively freed 
imports for FDI producers.  The currency was devalued further to 4.8 Yuan per USD in 
1990,  the  dual  exchange  rate  integrated  in  1994  and  current  account  convertibility 
formally introduced in 1995.  External trade was therefore effectively freed for foreign 
producers between mid-1980s and mid-1990s.  
4.2.3  FDI 
The third important market element is foreign capital in the form of Foreign direct 
investment  (FDI).    Compared  to  the  control  exercised  over  domestic  capital,  FDI  is 
attracted through the application of market principles.  Namely FDI will only come if the 
expectation of profit is high.  Conditions have therefore been created using every socialist 
control (indirect subsidy) at its command to attract FDI to China and to ensure that it 
finds it profitable to keep expanding exports.  Policy has been liberalised whenever it was 
necessary  to  keep  inflows  of  FDI  and  outflows  of  exports  from  faltering.    This  has 
included fairly early opening of both the real estate sector and of retail trade. 
The first FDI investors to take advantage of the freeing of trade were producers 
from Hong Kong and Macao who shifted their export production to Guangdong SEZs in 
China starting in the mid-1980s.
32   In 1990 55% of all (realised) foreign investment came 
from Hong Kong and Macao and by 1992 Hong Kong’s share in total Chinese exports 
had  risen  to  44%.      Producer-exporters  from  Taiwan  (to  Fujian)  and  other  overseas 
Chinese followed with the shift from their home countries to China accelerating in the 
early 1990s. 
4.3  PRIVATE FRINGE 
There is also a small proportion of the domestic (i.e. non-FDI) manufacturing 
sector that could be classified as a genuinely private sector.  This consists mostly of 
individual (atomistic) producers who supply labour intensive goods to exporters and FDI 
producers.  Though there is no direct management control by the CCP, the latter always 
has  the  residual  power  to  destroy  anyone  who  steps  too  much  outside  the  limits 
acceptable to higher party authorities. 
                                                            
32 In 1979 22.6% of China’s total exports were to Hong Kong, of which only 21% were exported.  By 1987 the shares had increased to 
31.1% and 62%. Hong Kong’s share in China’s manufactured exports was even higher ranging from 46% in textiles to 62% in 
clothing to 87% in machinery (Sung(1991)).    
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Genuinely private enterprises consist of two types: Individual (e.g. push carts) and 
those with one or more employees.  In 1998 the former constituted 99.8% of the 6 mi 
such enterprises.  Further out of the total 56% were in the service sector (mainly food & 
retail).        Thus  there  were  probably  as  little  as  6000  (1/2  of  0.2%  of  6  mi)  private 
manufacturing  enterprises  in  1998.    Some  progressive  Provinces/cities  such  as 
Guangdong  (Shunde)  and  Wenzhou  (Zhejang)  did  try  to  promote  private 
entrepreneurship and privatisation (Huang(2003) pp 110, 129).  Given existing laws this 
required  innovative  steps  like  joint  govt-private  structure  and  labelling  of  firms  as 
collective enterprises.  
According  to  Huang  (2003)  there  is  a  systematic  bias  against  domestic  private 
entrepreneurship, arising from the need to minimise any potential threat to the CCP’s 
monopoly of political power.  FDI investors cannot pose a political threat to the CCPs 
rule so the party has been quite willing to provide a playing field that is heavily tilted in 
their favour.  In contrast, a strong independent group of private domestic entrepreneurs 
could at some time in the future become an alternative source of political power.  Thus 
the  capital  and  other  markets  under  government  control  are  heavily  biased  against 
genuine private domestic entrepreneurs, if not completely closed to them.  
5  GROWTH MODEL 
China  is  a  nationalist  State  with  a  clear  vision  of  national  power  through 
economic growth and technological catch-up.  The Chinese Communist party translates 
this vision into explicit objectives suitable for different levels (nation, province,  city, 
firm)  that  are  broadly  coherent  but  far  from  perfect  (not  devoid  of  contradictions). 
Among the sub-goals that this translates into are increased sales/production, value added, 
investment and technology transfer from the advanced countries. The growth strategy for 
achieving these objectives has evolved over time.  Starting from the mid-1970s it first 
became an export-led growth strategy and then from the mid-1980s an FDI-export led 
growth  strategy.    Underlying  these  has  been  the  development  of  domestic  product 
markets and the evolution of the management structures of government enterprises to 
meet the challenges of competition in domestic and global markets.  
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5.1  OBJECTIVES 
In  general  terms  the  objective  of  the  CCP  is  to  increase  China’s  global  power 
subject to itself retaining power internally and indefinitely.  In the process of achieving 
the primary objective, the people should be reasonably content and no significant sub-
group  should  become  so  unhappy  as  to  revolt  against  CCP  rule.   More  formally  the 
objective is the maximisation of economic growth subject to the maintenance of existing 
welfare of all groups.  The objective is differs from that adopted by “Nationalist Market 
Economies,” or “Corporate States,” such as Japan and S. Korea prior to their becoming 
high-income  countries,  where  growth  maximisation  was  subject  to  the constraint  that 
welfare of all groups of citizens must be rising.  Both approaches however contrast with 
the  Social  Welfare  maximisation  objective  of  the  governments  of  most  “democratic 
market economies.”
33 
The  growth  maximisation  objective  percolates  down  the  CCP  network  and 
becomes the major, if not primary objective of every level of government (Province, City, 
Town, village) as well as of the managers of firms appointed by them.  There is enough 
flexibility  in  the  system  to  adapt  the  objectives  to  the  particular  circumstances  and 
constraints of each level and the area in which it operates.  At the level of the firm, the 
growth maximisation objective could be translated either into a market share objective 
similar to Corporate Capitalism or a value added maximisation objective that combines 
the  interests  of  labour/managers  and  capital.    Thus  even  CCP  appointed  managers 
compete in product markets.  Unlike managers in corporate capitalism, however, they are 
subject to the guidelines and constraints arising from national/provincial/city objectives 
set (& conveyed) by the CCP (boss).  They therefore often have to balance (trade-off) 
firm against national or provincial objectives (e.g. employment). 
5.2  MEANS 
The primary means of achieving high growth is a high investment rate.  This has 
two prongs.  One socialist/public sector investment and the second is Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). This is combined with an unprecedented degree of export orientation.  
Thus  public  investment,  FDI  and  exports  are  the  three  pillars  of  China’s  successful  
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growth maximisation strategy.
34  The policy framework and the CCP network has been 
moulded to maximise these three critical elements of the growth strategy.  Everything 
else  has  a  secondary  or  marginal  role  in  explaining  non-agricultural  growth  to  date, 
though it may become more relevant in future.  FDI-Export led growth has earlier been 
an important part of the growth strategy of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
but  China  has  taken  this  to  a  new  level  and  scale.    China  has  (so  far)  successfully 
combined this with levels of public investment not seen since the collapse of the USSR. 
5.3  FOUNDATION: Public Investment 
The public ownership of assets has been an important contributor to the fast growth 
of China’s economy as it allows a motivated government to use these profits either for  
public investment or to provide subsidies to FDI or exporters and thus indirectly boost 
investment.    Unlike  a  democratic  market  economy  like  India,  China  did  not  need  to 
generate funds for public investment (or subsidies) through taxes that distort markets and 
reduce efficiency and productivity.  Government appointed/controlled managers cannot 
however match the innovativeness of private entrepreneurs or the efficiency of growth 
maximising private firms (e.g. Zaibatsu, Chaebols).  Though public ownership of assets 
has driven growth so far it can become the greatest source of weakness as public profits 
decline and disappear reducing public investment and stalling the entire economy. Past 
strength and future weakness are two sides of the same coin. 
A very large fraction of assets are still owned and controlled by the State/CCP 
network, which appoints the top management in listed companies, co-operatives, T&V 
enterprises and State owned enterprises (“Socialist enterprises”).  Kuijis has shown that 
enterprise  investment  has  ranged  between  27%  and  35%  since  1990.    Though 
Government  /State  saving  is  between  4.8%  and  8.1%  of  GDP  (low  government 
consumption on social services) it is in line with those of other countries.  The govt has 
been  investing  about  2.2%  to  4.3%  of  GDP  and  transferring  the  rest  to  socialist 
enterprises for investment.  The public sector (state + socialist enterprises) therefore has a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33 Though a model can always be constructed in which the two objectives result in identical policies, we are 
talking about the real world of layers of government servants working on dozens of sectors and 100s of 
sub-sectors. 
34 Econometric evidence is presented in the section 4.5.  
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high share of national profits and consequently China can have both low tax rates and 
very high investment rates. 
As an illustration consider the situation when the State owned 100% of the capital 
assets.  A capital-output ratio of 4 along with an 8% rate of return on assets would have 
resulted in non-tax revenues of 32% of GDP.
35  Thus reinvestment of public returns to 
capital along with FDI inflows of 8% of GDP (7.4% in 1993, 5% in 2002) would result in 
a 40% investment rate without recourse to any taxes. Gross fixed investment was less 
than 31% of GDP till 1992 and reached 40% in 2002. Any tax revenues could therefore 
be used to subsidise certain types of exports/FDI.   
As the table (below) shows Chinese government’s direct investment (including in 
infrastructure) was the same in China as in India during 1993 to 2000. It rose sharply in 
China during 2001 and 2002 but has returned to earlier levels in 2003. 
 
Table 1: Gross Investment of Government as a percent of GDP 
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01
93-00 93-02
India
AdminDep+DPE 3.1% 3.0% 3.6% 3.7% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 1.8%
Admin Depts 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
China
Govt Invest 3.1% 3.3% 2.8% 2.9% 2.7% 2.7% 3.1% 3.5% 3.4% 3.5%




High rates of investment in infrastructure since the mid-1990s may have reflected a 
change  in  the  allocation  of  public  expenditure,  initially  driven  by  the  unemployment 
created  by  SOE  closure  and  weaker  export  demand  during  the  Asian  crises.
36    This 
investment was not however, carried out directly by the government.  The government 
however,  ‘financed  investment  via  capital  transfers  to  state-owned  enterprises  in  the 
power, electricity, water, transport and other infrastructure sectors [Kuijs(2005)].’ The 
                                                            
35 According to Prof Xianon Xue of the China Europe International Business School, Shanghai, the earning before interest and tax 
(EBIT) has fallen from 12% of assets in 1992 to 4% in 2003.  He also indicated that FDI was 7% of total investment and that the bulk 
of investment was still made by government firms. 
36 Around 1994-95 many SOEs were shut resulting in large pockets of unemployment.  The Asian crises added to this by weakening of 
global demand for China’s exports, thus increasing the losses from exports by government owned firms.  Infrastructure spending was 
therefore increased in the second half of the nineties so as to increase job creation (Keynesian aspect).  The positive effect on China’s 
image were soon recognised and publicised effectively to attract more FDI, including export oriented FDI.  
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transfers  were  6.2%  of  GDP  in  2001  (op  cit)  and  the  excess  of  govt  saving  over 
investment was only 3.7% of GDP.  This implies that 2.5% of GDP must have gone as 
subsidy  from  government  to  SOEs.      In  any  case  a  substantial  part  of  China’s 
infrastructure investment seems to be through enterprises (socialist and foreign JVs).
37  
Table 2: Enterprise Investment and Saving 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Enterprises
 Investment 24.7% 25.3% 28.5% 35.5% 33.2% 32.9% 30.6% 29.1% 28.6% 28.4% 27.3% 29.0%
 Saving 11.5% 13.0% 13.4% 16.2% 16.0% 16.4% 13.4% 14.2% 14.1% 14.1% 15.5% 15.0%
 Invest-Saving 13.2% 12.3% 15.1% 19.3% 17.2% 16.5% 17.2% 14.9% 14.5% 14.3% 11.8% 14.0%
Source:  Kuijs (2005)  
 
Table 2 shows the very high rates of investment by enterprises ranging from 24.7% 
of GDP to 35.5% of GDP during the 1990s.  It is consistent with the hypothesis of this 
paper that investment by  ‘socialist owned’ enterprises (‘public sector’) has played an 
important role in China’s growth. 
The  USSR’s  early  growth  was  also  founded  on  high  levels  of  government 
investment.  Growth however stalled after the economy reached middle- income, because 
the USSR was largely cut-of from the global economy and the global technology pool.  
This lack of concern for social benefit-cost means that the marginal product of public 
capital may fall to zero or even become negative because of excess capacity.  We know 
from  the  USSR  experience  that  this  can  lead  to  un-saleable  inventory  stock,  falling 
capacity utilisation and collapse.  Though inventory investment in China reached a peak 
of 10.4% of GDP in 1989 it had declined 0.2% of GDP by 2002.
38   China therefore 
appears to have successfully dealt with this problem so far by liberalising output/product 
markets  and  orienting  its  system  to  push  exports.    The  former  helps  avoid  obvious 
mismatches  between  consumer/user  demand  and  public  sector  output.    Despite  this, 
exports are an important channel for utilising excess capacity in tradable goods, a version 
of the old ‘vent for surplus,’ with marginal cost pricing and indirect subsidies aiding this 
effort.  Such exports can (also) help in exploiting scale economies by building plants with 
capacity larger than domestic demand. The unabashed promotion of export-oriented FDI 
has proved to be a vital means for achieving efficient and sustainable export growth.  
                                                            
37 See Virmani (2004d) for an analysis of the policy approach needed for development of infrastructure in 
India.  
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Because global export shares have to be raised at such a frenetic pace a fall in unit values 
is inevitable in some goods and markets.
39  
Rising  implicit  subsidies  and  declining  returns  to  public  capital  will  eventually 
make it difficult to maintain such high rates of public investment.  Listing of govt owned 
companies and banks on foreign and domestic stock exchanges is a clever way to get 
foreign equity capital to finance public investment.  This suggests return on capital may 
already be so low as to create a shortage of funds for investment and implicit subsidy. 
Lardy (1999) estimates that the rate of return on capital in State owned enterprises has 
fallen from 25% at the start of reform to 6% in 1997.
40  Lardy also estimates that the 
consequent decline in public saving from 30% of GDP to 20% has been more than offset 
by a rise in household saving from 0% to 20% of GDP(overwhelmingly in banks or 
currency).
41   It would not surprise if international capital markets readily provide these 
funds on the illusion that this means privatisation of Govt companies or banks.
42  If these 
funds are not forthcoming or when they run out China will have to alter its development 
strategy more fundamentally.   
The exceptionally high aggregate growth rates of the past two years have made 
even normally loss making units temporarily profitable.  This is however unlikely to be 
maintained when growth rates return to normal levels (historical averages). 
5.4  ENGINE: FDI and Exports 
Foreign direct investment is the second pillar of China’s growth.  China has learnt 
from and built upon the experience of Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, the pioneers of 
FDI-export led growth.  It has aggressively pursued FDI by identifying potential FDI 
investors  across  the  globe,  including  in  other  successful  low  and  middle-income 
countries.  It has then laid out a red carpet for every FD investor that can help raise 
China’s technological levels, skills and expertise or can directly or indirectly raise the 
level  of  exports  on  a  sustainable  basis.    The  welcome  mat  included  all  inducements 
needed to ensure that they set up base in China (including capital subsidies).  Since 1997 
                                                                                                                                                                             
38 The previous peak was 8.4% of GDP in 1978. 
39 This is happening for instance in textile exports to the USA. 
40 If ROC has fallen over a decade by 8% points in (show piece) publicly listed companies (Prof Xue, foot note 10), then the ROC in 
other govt firms is likely to average between 0%-4%. 
41 Profitability of SOEs has however jumped up sharply in the last two years of phenomenally high growth. 
42 As Abraham Lincoln said, “You can fool all the people some of the time,” perhaps in China a lot more time than he imagined.  
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FDI has been between 3.2% and 4.9% of GDP.  According to Kuijs (2005) Net external 
financing of enterprise investment – from the banking sector and via net foreign direct 
investment  (FDI)  –  is  high  compared  to  other  countries  and  contributes  1/3
rd  of 
investment finance.  
FDI and exports have been the engine of efficient economic growth since 1985. 
Adoption of an FDI-export led growth strategy converted China from an autarchy into an 
essential link in the global production chain developed between 1965 and 1985 by the 
Newly  Industrialising  Economies  and  the  ASEAN  4.    China  created  conditions 
(suspension of labour rights, capital subsidies to counter every negative) for a wholesale 
shift  of  labour  intensive  (LI)  production  by  Chinese  entrepreneurs  from  Hong  Kong, 
Taiwan  and  other  countries  in  S.  E.  Asia  to  the  Special  Export  Zones  and  Regions.  
59.3% of FDI between 1978 and 1999 came from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao.
43 The 
share was much higher in the initial years and has declined over time.  It was 68.2% in 
1994 and 40.2% in 2003 (Prasad & Wei(2005)).  Detailed data for 1995 shows that the 
share  of  foreign  invested  enterprises  (foreign  equity  share  >  25%)  in  manufactured 
exports was 51.2%.  FIE’s share in exports of electronics and telecommunications was 
94.5%,  in instruments 71.8%, in plastic products 77.2%, in printing and record pressing 
79.4%, in furniture 79.4%, in leather products 73.2%, in metal products 61.1% and in 
Garments and footwear 60.5% (Huang(2003), table 1.4). Another 17% of manufactured 
exports take place through export processing where the buyer supplies the inputs, detailed 
designs & specifications and quality inspection  & control personel and  gets back the 
output  for  export.
44      Thus  these  labour  intensive  (LI)  export  goods  are  now  highly 
competitive. Along with the support system provided by the socialist-corporate state, this 
gives China a comparative advantage in organised labour intensive mass manufacturing. 
The conventional wisdom is that China’s phenomenal success in LI exports is due 
to  the  superior  productivity  of  Chinese  workers.  In  reality  the  per-hour  worker 
productivity is not much different from that in any other country at a similar level of 
income (perhaps lower). The output per man-month is however much higher because 
hours  worked  per  week/month  are  up  to  100%  higher  than  in  equivalent  democratic 
                                                            
43 Almost 50% was from Hong Kong during 1979 to 1999(Huang(2003) pp 36, 48) 
44 Huang(2003) p15.  The share of HK & Taiwan in FDI was 61.8% in 1995, and another 4.9% was from Singapore.  
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market economies, being unconstrained by (implementation of) bourgeois labour laws.  
Now  that  China  has  developed  a  comparative  advantage  in  mass  manufacturing  and 
construction, it is likely to persist even if hours worked gradually decline from ‘socialist’ 
to ‘democratic’ levels. 
Non-labour intensive exports (even those produced by FDI) are not necessarily 
competitive.  The banking system provides loans to State enterprises (e.g. SOEs) and 
provincial/city  governments  producing  intermediate  goods  and  infrastructure  services 
respectively at zero or negative effective capital cost. These implicit subsidies are then 
transformed through below cost prices, into explicit subsidies to the FDI-export complex 
and to hi-tech industry.
45  This is a significant factor in attracting hi-tech/skill intensive 
FDI  and  capital-intensive  exports.    Through  this  process  some  competitive  items  are 
undoubtedly discovered or created and these, along with less than competitive items, are 
part of the set of capital intensive (KI) and skill-intensive (SI) exports. 
The banking losses arising from these implicit subsidies have been  repeatedly 
capitalised by the government budget during the last five years.  If this is a real rather 
than a paper transaction, the enterprise profits available for re-investment will be reduced.  
In this case either taxes on the FDI-export sector have to increase or the supply of free 
public services has to be reduced.
46  The former either undermines the usefulness and 
sustainability  of  the  high  public  investment  that  is  the  foundation  of  China’s  growth 
maximisation strategy or offsets the subsidies given to the FDI export sector (increasing 
inefficiency). 
In the last five years, the first class infrastructure in and around the FDI-export 
hubs is advertised as an important factor in the high share/growth of KI and SI exports 
from China.  The building of showpiece infrastructure well ahead of demand certainly 
helps in attracting attention and approbation from investors and adds to the attractiveness 
of China as an FDI location.  Further, even if infrastructure is highly under utilised it is a 
permanent asset that will become useful at some time.  However, if its marginal social 
return is zero or negative, the sustainability of the public reinvestment strategy becomes 
doubtful as returns dwindle making it necessary to raise distorting taxes.  It should also 
                                                            
45 The prices of intermediate goods in China are reportedly less than their price on the high seas outside India – i.e before taxes, delays 
or red tape.   
46 The latter is related to the income distribution point discussed below.  
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not be forgotten that poor infrastructure in Jakarta, Indonesia and Bangkok, Thailand did 
not prevent these two countries from growing fast for decades. 
Tseng and Zebregs (2002) estimate that FDI contributed 2.5% per annum to TFP 
growth  and  about  3%  per  annum  to  overall  GDP  growth.    This  suggests  that  the 
difference between China’s and India’s growth rate since 1980 can largely be explained 
by the difference in FDI inflows (including export-oriented FDI). 
5.5  Empirical Analysis 
The following OLS growth regressions for China for the period 1982 to 2002 based 
on data available in World Development Indicators 2002, support the analysis presented 
above.  All variables are in growth rates (represented by the preface Gr). The independent 
variable is Growth rate of per capita GDP.  Dependent variables are the rates of growth 
(Gr) of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), World GDP (Gwrld) and FDI gross in 
US $ (FDIg$): 
 
GrPcGdp= 0.54 + 0.24*GrGfcf + 0.12*GrGfcf(-1) + 1.03 GrGwrld + 0.017*GrFDIg$ 
        (1.0)    (3.6)***         (3.9)***       (4.6)***        (2.5)*** 
R
2 = 0.96, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.95, DW = 2.1. Numbers in bracket are t values. *** is 
significant at 1% level. 
  Similar results are obtained using TSLS.
47  The export dependency of the Chinese 
economy is suggested by the fact that a 1% increase (decrease) in the rate of growth of 
the world economy raises(lowers) China’s growth rate by 1%.  
If we replace gross FDI by net FDI (FDIn$ is in US $) the equation becomes; 
GrPcGdp= 132-0.07*Year+0.26*GrGfcf+0.1*GrGfcf(-1)+0.78*GrGwrld-0.54*GrFDIn$ 
   (1.8)*  (-1.8)*  (7.6)***       (4.0)***   (3.6)***  (-2.1)* 
R
2  =  0.94,  R
2  (adjusted)  =  0.92,  DW  =  2.1.  Numbers  in  bracket  are  t  values.  *  is 
significant at 10% level, *** is significant at 1% level.
 48 
Thus  a  1%  increase  (decrease)  in  net  FDI  inflow  increases  the  per  capita  GDP 
growth rate by 0.5%.  
                                                            
47 Instruments include growth rates of world imports, China’s population & labor force and exports(lagged). 
48  If the same equation is run with TSLS, year and FDIn$ become non-significant. If year is dropped from 
the equation, FDIn$ is significant at the 10% level.  
  30 
These regressions show the strong investment led nature of China’s growth and the 
role of World demand GDP on China’s growth.  The latter represents the opportunity for 
exports at unsubsidised rates or without lowering unit values.  FDI plays an important 
role in China’s growth. These results are consistent with an FDI-export led growth. 
The  importance  of  FDI  is  also  brought  out  by  the  following  sources  of  growth 
equation (estimated for 1966 onwards) in which the prefix Gr represents the growth rate, 
Gdp_L represents GDP per unit of labour and Kf_L is fixed capital per unit of labour:
49 
GrGdp_L = 1.47+0.832*GrKf_L+0.283*AR(1) 
       (1.9)    (2.9)***          (1.9)* 
R
2 = 0.29, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.24, DW = 1.79.
50 
   
Using the parameters of this equation we can calculate TFPG as, 
TFPGa = GrGdp_L – 0.832*GrKf_L or TFPG= TFPGa-1.47.  
 
Then by OLS, 
TFPG = 478 – 0.24*year + 0.04*FDIg$z 
      (4.4)***  (-4.4)***  (5.9)*** 
R
2 = 0.83, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.81, DW = 1.88.   
 
This equation shows that,  
(a) FDI is a driver of productivity growth.  
(b) There is a secular down trend in productivity growth. We hypothesise that this is the 
result  of  excessive  investment  by  socialist  enterprises  and  the  consequent  decline  in 
marginal  productivity  of  capital  in  these  enterprises.  The  high  investment  is  the 
counterpart  of  the  party  encouraged/sanctioned  objective  of  growth  (value  added) 
maximisation, low or zero dividend payment requirement, transfer of saving from the 
government budget and subsidies provided through the controlled banking system (so 
called NPAs). 
                                                            
49 The capital stock series is built using perpetual inventory method using GFCF and assuming a 5% depreciation rate. 
50 Capital’s share is much lower (0.54) and DW very low if we estimate from 1977 onwards.  
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6  OUTCOME  
6.1  INCOME GROWTH 
If we go by the official statistics, China’s economy grew at an average rate of 
9.5% per annum during 1980 to 2003, the fastest in the World.  During this period the 
World share of China in Merchandise Trade saw the largest expansion and China became 
the  largest  recipient  of  FDI.  Collins  and  Bosworth  (1996),  corroborated  later  by  the 
World Bank and IMF, have shown that China’s growth from 1980 to end-nineties was 
overestimated by 1% to 2%.  Young (2000) shows that non-agricultural growth is over-
estimated by 2.5%.  If we make an adjustment of 2%, China has demonstrated its ability 
to sustain growth at about 7.5% per annum over 25 years.  This is still the fastest in the 
World, but only 30% higher than India’s the 9
th fastest growing economy.
51 The IMF 
(2004) has, however, shown that China’s growth so far (as measured by official statistics) 
is  on  a  trajectory  similar  to  that  of  Japan  and  the  NIEs  in  a  similar  period  of  their 
development, though it is faster than that of the ASEAN-4.   
In  the  last  few  decades,  China’s  growth  has  benefited  from  the  demographic 
dividend.  As the demographic transition is coming to an end this dividend will soon be 
reduced to zero.
52  The 1990s were a period of above average international trade growth 
and the current decade could see a slower growth in goods trade.  As China’s share of the 
World’s goods exports rises to US levels its export growth will slow.  China has also 
benefited from the large gap between its per capita income and its manufacturing wage 
relative to India and other labour intensive exporters. The gap is likely to be eliminated as 
its per capita income rises to upper-middle income levels and then to high-income levels.  
The closing and inversion of the wage gap will contribute to the slowdown in export 
growth and FDI inflows.  Most observers have been forecasting a slow down in China’s s 
growth rate and a few have even predicted a dramatic slowdown.
53  On balance, China’s 
growth rate is likely to decline gradually to more normal levels from the stratospheric rate 
of 9.5%, despite the sharp increase in this rate in the last two years. 
                                                            
51 About 60% higher in terms of per capita growth. 
52 After a decade or two it will become negative because of the rapid aging of its population. 
53 See IMF, World Bank and ADB reports on China and Chang (2001).  See also Virmani (1999).  
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6.2  INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The distribution of income has worsened dramatically since 1979. Part of this 
deterioration is the reversal of unsustainable levels of equality reached during the Maoist 
years.  The rest of the deterioration was a conscious decision to accelerate growth by 
focussing  subsidies  and  infrastructure  development  into  the  FDI-export  areas  in  the 
coastal regions during 1985 to 2000.  Given the restrictions on internal movement of 
workers (the labour responsibility system) this translated into growing income inequality.  
Out  of  total  of  127  countries  China  ranks  91  in  terms  of  the  Gini  co-efficient  of 
inequality,  and  94
th  in  terms  of  the  consumption  share  of  the  poorest  20%  of  the 
population.  Further,  the  retreat  of  the  state  from  provision  of  social  goods  has  also 
translated into greater inequality in the receipt of public and quasi-public goods. Rising 
inequality  and  declining  public  social  services  have  a  potential  for  socio-political 
upheaval and counter repression that could disrupt growth. 
6.3  RISKS 
The FDI-export drive is critically dependent on building and sustaining optimistic 
expectations about the economy and the Asian crises demonstrated the vulnerability of 
this model.  The obverse of high social ownership of domestic assets and consequent high 
investment rates is a low share of private consumption in GDP.  The rate of capacity 
build up is much faster than the growth of private consumption, leaving exports as the 
only means for balancing supply and demand. China’s membership of WTO and rising 
job  fears  in  OECD  countries  will  result  in  increased  scrutiny  of  and  resistance  to 
subsidised exports.  Its socially regressive labour rules for export oriented manufacturing, 
may also be questioned more seriously, if not by governments then by Western Labour 
unions and NGOs.   
Given the continuing  generation of non-performing assets, China is somewhat 
more vulnerable on these issues than the Asian crises countries.
54  Its income distribution 
is also worse than in other successful Asian economies. On the other hand China’s large 
economy has domestic strengths and bargaining power that were absent in the smaller 
Asian countries.  These will result (in our judgement) in a slowing of growth and not a 
                                                            
54 Which have resulted in a (World Bank estimated) national debt of 50% to 100% of GDP. See Jia Kang & Zhao (2001).  
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sudden collapse if the CCP/Government continues to adapt its policy to the changing 
circumstances and imperatives as it has repeatedly done since 1980. 
One of the ironic effects of China’s export led growth is the recreation of Centre-
Periphery relationship that Latin American economist talked about 50 years ago. Instead 
of the USA of the fifties, China of the 21
st century is the manufacturing workshop of the 
world,  diverting  FDI  in  manufacturing  (including  export  oriented  FDI)  out  of  other 
developing countries, while sucking in mineral and agricultural imports from them.  Thus 
the resource rich countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are the (new) periphery 
supplying primary commodities to China the new manufacturing centre of the World.  
Just as in the case of 20
th century America, a reaction may build up against 21
st century 
China. 
6.4  POLITICS 
 There are political arguments for a sharp slowdown in economic growth arising 
from rising inequalities and social tensions.  Some have gone further to argue that there is 
an  inherent  contradiction  between  the  market  economy  whose  success  requires 
competition and plurality and the centralised political system that suppresses independent 
democratic thinking and impulses.
55  If the contradiction cannot be managed it has within 
it the seeds of a socio-political explosion that will bring growth to a halt for a substantial 
period of time (after which it could resume at a much slower rate). This contradiction is 
much  more  than  it  was  in  S  Korea  (say)  and  the  latter  eventually  succumbed  to  the 
democratic  impulse.  The  counter  argument  is  that  dictators  can  and  have  maintained 
highly  repressive  regime  for  decades  after  upheaval.    Whether  growth  rate  can  be 
maintained along with repression depends on the response of the rest of the world. 
7  Comparative Performance: India 
7.1  Reform Impact: J curve 
According to India’s National accounts data GDP and per capita GDP have grown 
at an average of 5.8% per annum and 3.8% per annum respectively during the last 25 
years (1980-1 to 2004-5).
56  The comprehensive reforms instituted in the 1990s have 
                                                            
55 K Subrahmanyam et all. 
56 The WDI data underestimate the GDP growth rate substantially though the per capita GDP growth rate is almost the same.  
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increased competitive pressures on the Indian economy while at the same time enhancing 
its ability to compete globally. The growth rate has however increased by only about 
0.6% point.
57   The opening of the economy to international trade seems to produce a J-
curve effect: The direct negative effects of competition appear immediately as capacity 
utilisation  falls  in  un-competitive  product  lines.    With  capital  immobile,  reduction  in 
capital stock is limited by the rate of depreciation.  The positive effects of competition on 
productivity  appear  gradually.    New  technology  is  first  adopted  by  the  pioneers  and 
effected through new investment.  It diffuses gradually to other firms in the industry.
58 
Improvements in productivity will therefore appear at the aggregate level only after a lag. 
The underlying medium term trend rate of growth in India is currently around 6.5% and 
could move up to 6.8%. 
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The  growth  rate  can  be  raised  further  to  7%  to  7.5%  thereafter  if  policy  and 
institutional reforms resume. The policy reforms include removal of controls on a host of 
sectors and sub-sectors that are the basis of the jungle of red tape and lead to bureaucratic 
delays, labour reform, and lifting of entry restrictions in education (see Virmani (2004a) 
                                                            
57 From 5.5% per annum during 1980-81 to 1991-2 to 6.1% during 1992-93 to 2003-4. Per capita GDP growth accelerated by 1% 
point from 3.3% to 4.3% per annum. 
58 There are numerous cases of firms that have transformed their systems and shown large increases in productivity.  The effects of 
these are not however available in the sector data.  
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for details).
59  Three specific (modern services, FDI, demographic transition) and three 
general factors make this increased growth feasible and sustainable. 
7.2  Services: Exports to GDP 
 First, the one area in which the improved competitiveness of the Indian economy 
is clearly visible is in the double-digit (20% to 30% per year) growth of Information 
technology (IT) and IT enabled services (ITES) export.  Though such non-traditional (i.e. 
excluding transport & tourism) service exports are already a significant share of India’s 
total exports, they constituted a very small part of the economy.  Therefore the impact on 
GDP growth was limited.  With the continuing high growth of non-traditional service 
export, they are now becoming large enough to have a measurable impact on GDP and 
their contribution to GDP growth could rise from 0.5% to 1.5% points over a decade.
60  
India is likely to become one of the largest suppliers of non–traditional services to the 
World over the next few decades (including R&D, financial, medical, educational and 
social services). OECD’s ageing citizens will benefit greatly from the universalization of 
medical services that their lower cost will make possible.  Old economy firms like GM 
which  are  have  become  uncompetitive  and  face  bankruptcy  because  of  accumulated 
pension  liabilities,  could  reduce  these  liabilities  in  exchange  for  provision  of  health 
services. 
7.3  FDI: Unexploited Potential 
The second factor is the un-exploited potential of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The proportion of FDI in total investment and GDP is very low in India compared to 
other  high  growth  Asian  countries  such  as  Singapore,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  China, 
Indonesia and Vietnam.  In contrast to China’s FDI-export led growth model, India’s 
growth has been led by domestic investment and entrepreneurship.
61  The positive role of 
FDI  in  growth  (marketing,  technology,  management  systems)  is  therefore  largely  un-
exploited.  A rise of FDI flows to $8bi to $10bi per annum will give a substantial boost to 
                                                            
59 This book summarises the reforms proposed in a series of internal papers done in the Ministry of Finance  (Department of Economic 
Affairs), Govt of India, from 1995 onwards.  The underlying theme of these suggestions is to increase competition in every market and 
sector by removing the distortions introduced by the Indian version of socialism and to focus government effort on the supply of 
public and quasi-public goods and services. 
60 Starting at the lower end and going up to the higher end of the range. 
61 See Khanna and Huang (2003) for a comparison with China.  
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productivity  and  growth.
62    India  is  already  an  attractive  location  for  skill-intensive 
manufacturing  because  of  the  high  quality  and  availability  of  middle  management/ 
technical skills and knowledge workers.  Several areas of competitiveness related to such 
skills are already visible, namely biotechnology, auto engineering (parts) and specialised 
chemicals.
63  
With China’s per capita income more than twice that of India’s and its per capita  
consumption 50% more than  India’s, its hourly wage will eventually  attain the same 
ratio.  Membership of the WTO and scrutiny by global NGOs will make it increasingly 
difficult for foreign invested firms in China to make people work 100 hours a week.  
India will therefore become a more attractive location for small & medium scale labour-
intensive manufactured exports vis-à-vis China.  The new Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
law can reduce red tape/bureaucracy, introduce much needed flexibility in labour laws, 
rules  and  procedures  and  accelerate  development  of  high  quality  infrastructure,  thus 
expediting this process.
64 FDI can play a critical role in integrating India into the global 
supply chain for a host of products.  If domestic hurdles to global operation are removed 
FDI could add at least a point to growth. 
7.4  Demographic Dividend 
The third important factor is the demographic transition that is taking place across 
the World.  The high growth of E & S.E. Asian countries was to a substantial degree due 
to the demographic transition (Bloom et al(2001) ).  This is the ∩ (inverted U) shape 
followed by the ratio of labour force to population.
65  With the supply of labour rising 
faster than population per capita GDP growth accelerates. Further the changes in the age 
profile (a decline in the average age of the labour force) results in a rise in the aggregate 
saving rate ensuring sufficient funds for investment.  China is nearing the end of its 
demographic  transition  with  the  labour  force  beginning  to  age  and  its  faster  growth 
period coming to an end.  India in contrast has entered the most positive phase of this 
demographic transition.  We estimate that this could add between 0.5% to 0.8% points to 
the growth of the Indian economy. 
                                                            
62 Several ICRIER working papers by Rashmi Banga have shown the positive effects of FDI in India.   
63 With the introduction of a product patent regime from this year, the protection of the legal system will now be available to drug 
developers. 
64 Sadly the provision for labor flexibility was dropped from the law at the insistence of the CPM & CPI.  
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In addition the population of Europe and Japan is aging rapidly and there will be a 
great demand from these economies for ‘youth-intensive’ goods and services, including 
R&D services.
66 Over the next half century India will have the youngest labour force in 
the  world.    India  is  therefore  likely  to  become  the  largest  exporter  of  such  ‘youth 
intensive services’.
67 
7.5  Intangibles 
There  are  also  several  general  factors  that  will  sustain  growth.    One  is  the 
existence of a large under-utilised pool of free thinking, autonomous working, high IQ 
people.  The normal distribution of IQ in a population means that 2% of population has 
very high IQ and 10% has high IQ.  Applying this to India we get 20mi and 100 mi 
people  respectively.    Bad  economic  policies  till  1980  contributed  to  gross  under-
utilisation  of  this  resource.    The  utilisation  rate  of  underutilised  brain  power  will 
increasingly rise along with the literacy rate, universalisation of primary education and  
better information about opportunities. 
The second is the high quality and diversity of India’s institutions and the social 
capital built over centuries.
68  The democratic system, including the relatively new non-
governmental  institutions  and  free  &  vibrant  media,  is  a  great  source  of  long-term 
strength. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) estimate that India’s (China’s) income level is 
15% lower (higher) than that predicted by the quality of its institutions. India’s income 
will therefore  rise to the predicted level with the correction of wrong  policies, while 
China will not be able to sustain the same growth at higher income levels where these 
institutions are critical.  
The third is the experience of working with citizens of very diverse backgrounds 
(religious, ethnic, language, sub-culture) and the facility with English. This pluralism and 
language facility is a unique advantage in the globalised 21
st century. India is also ideally 
placed to partner OECD countries in the emerging global knowledge economy of the 21
st 
                                                                                                                                                                             
65 The dependency ratio follows a U shape first falling then rising. 
66 For instance a study has shown that Nobel prise winners in Physics did their most productive work below or around the age of 25. 
67 As China’s population will age much earlier than that of India it is not in a position to exploit this opportunity. 
68 China had similarly high levels of social capital but much of this was destroyed during the communist revolution and the cultural 
revolution.  
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century.    These  specific  and  general  factors  are  sufficient  to  overcome  any  negative 
growth factors, to raise growth to a sustainable 7% or so.
69  
7.6  Poverty 
There are some questions raised by India-sceptics about poverty and inequality in 
India, which have to be viewed in the light of the following facts. India is a low-income 
country, so the proportion of poor is still high (about 22% according to conventional 
methods).
70  The absolute number of poor is thus larger than the total population of all 
but two countries (USA and China).  It is democratic so the poor are free to live and work 
anywhere and are therefore visible everywhere.  India’s income distribution is, however, 
among the top quarter of the 127 countries for which the Gini co-efficient is available.
71 
It does very well for the poorest 10% whose consumption share is the 6
th highest among 
these 127 countries.
72  India is one of a handful of high growth countries whose income 
distribution has not worsened significantly during the high growth period.
73  By 2010, 
when  India  becomes  a  lower-middle  income  country,  the  conventionally  measured 
poverty  rate  will  be  reduced  to  about  15%.
74    Poverty  is  likely  to  be  completely 
eliminated by the time it becomes an upper-middle income country around 2025.
75 
According to Bhalla (2003) the poverty rate is about 12%. This is the correct rate 
for comparison with that of China as shown by the following simple exercise.  China’s 
poverty level based on an income survey is estimated by the World Bank to be 16.5% 
using a $ a day poverty line and 46.7% using a $2 a day poverty line.  As India’s poverty 
rate is based on a consumption survey, we have to either assume that the consumption 
share of China are the same as its income shares (estimate 1) or that its consumption 
shares in the two lowest (10% each) brackets are higher than its income shares in these 
brackets (estimate 2).  In the latter case we assume further that in China the consumption 
share of the bottom 10% is 50% higher than the income share and of the next lowest 10% 
                                                            
69 A more optimistic scenario is also possible in which growth reaches the 7.5%-8% range and remains there for a decade or so.  The 
probability of this is 10-15% in our view.  Surjit Bhalla has been asserting for the last 3 years that India’s growth rate will soon exceed 
8%.  
70 The poverty rate or Head count ratio is 29
th out of 87 countries for which data is reported. 
71 32
nd  to be precise.  
72 14
th for consumption share of bottom 20% and 25
th for bottom 40% of the population. 
73 Cornea and Court (2001). 
74 Based on official rate in 1999-2000 (26%) adjusted for survey changes (i.e.28%-29%). We assume a decline of 1% point per year 
based on the average decline since 1980.  
75 Before that the national poverty line will probably be raised.  
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is 25% higher.
76  From the data we also see that the China’s per capita GDP at PPP in 
current international dollars was 1.6 times India’s (average ratio for 1999 to 2001).  As 
the share of private consumption in GDP in China is 71% of that in India,
77 China’s per 
capita private consumption was only 1.1 times India’s (average for 1999 to 2001).  Using 
the  consumption  distribution  along  with  the  per  capita  private  consumption  we  can 
calculate the per capita consumption of the bottom 10% 20% and 40% of the population 
in each country (table 2).   
The results in table 3 show that the per capita consumption of China’s poorest 
10% to 20% is between 52% and 80% of India’s poorest 10% to 20% in real terms.  Thus 
the 1$ a day poverty rate in India must be lower than in China (16.5%).   Similarly the $2 
a day poverty rate in China (46.7%) is unlikely to be lower than India’s because the per 
capita consumption of the bottom 40% in China is 80% to 100% of that of the lowest 
40% in India.  
 




Lowest 10% 0.52 0.78
Lowest 20% 0.59 0.79
Lowest 40% 0.82 0.97
China Share Adj factor
Lowest 10% 1.8 1.5 2.7
Lowest 20% 4.7 1.35 6.3
Lowest 40% 9.0 1.18 10.6
India Share
Lowest 10% 3.9 1 3.9
Lowest 20% 8.9 1 8.9
Lowest 40% 12.3 1 12.3
Note: Estimate 1 assumes that China's consump-
-tion distribution is same as its income distribution
Estimate 2
and increasing that of next 10% by 25%
Estimate 2: Obtains China's consumption share by
increasing its income share of lowest 10% by 50%
 
 
                                                            
76 As the rich are widely accepted to save a larger share of their income than the poor, the consumption 
distribution is expected to be better that the income distribution.  
77 China’s private consumption (Total consumption – Government final consumption) is 46.8% and India’s 
65.5% of GDP (LCU). All data is from WDI, World Bank.  
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7.7  Governance Issues 
The  greatest  long-term  weakness  in  India  is  on  the  political  side.  Infirmities  in  its 
political system have led over the last 4 decades, to a deterioration in the quality and 
quantity of public goods (roads, policing, legal system.) and quasi-public goods supplied.  
The high fiscal deficit is a symptom of this deterioration in governance.  Differences in 
quality  of  governance  across  States  are  also  an  important  cause  of  rising  interstate 
differences in growth rates and poverty (head count ratio). The governments’ lack of 
success in suppressing Maoist and other insurgencies in the interiors of the country is 
another reflection of government failure.  The issue is not, however, one of corruption but 
the supply of public and quasi-public goods and services (e.g. public safety & security, 
urban  planning,  water  supply,  sewage  &  sanitation,  roads;  airports,  highways)  and 
government monopolised utilities (electricity).  China’s government(s) at different levels 
are not less corrupt than India’s but the former produce the public goods & services 
necessary for growth while the latter do not.
78 
Political/governmental reforms are necessary over the next decade to ensure that 
the system remains on even keel.
79 This down trend in governance must be reversed and 
one  is  optimistic  that  it  will  be  reversed,  given  the  strength  of  non-governmental 
institutions such as the media and non-profit organisations and the more active role of the 
higher  judiciary  and  independent  bodies  such  as  the  Election  Commission.    Though 
Indian democracy responds slowly to such intangible threats, it has always been able to 
deal  with  them  in  a  democratic  and  non-disruptive  manner.  However,  because  we 
anticipate a slow correction of this weakness, the Indian economy is unlikely to grow at 
7.5% to 8% despite other strengths. 
                                                            
78 Sadly the public has for too long let governments get away with non-performance on public goods under 
the obfuscation that it is working for (spending resources on) the welfare of the poor.  This appears to be 
changing along with greater competition in the media. 
79 See Virmani (2004a) for the new development paradigm needed for high growth in India.  
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8  FUTURE: MEAN FORECAST 
Based on the above analysis we project the size of China and India relative to the 
USA and relative to each other (figures 2 & 3) based on the assumptions in Table3.
80 
 
Table 4: Rate of Growth of GDPppp (%) 
 
Period India China
2006 to 2010 6.4 7.3
2011 to 2020 7.0 6.5
2021 to 2030 6.9 5.5
2031 to 2040 6.0 4.4
2041 to 2050 5.0 3.5  
 
Figure 2 shows that the Indian economy is likely to become larger than Japan’s 
(GDP at Purchasing Power Parity) in the next few years.  It also shows that both the 
Chinese economy and the Indian economy will become larger than that of the USA in 
about 10 years and 30 years respectively.  Figure 3 shows the size of India’s economy 
relative to China’s.  India’s economy which was equal in size to that of China in 1983 
was already down to 80% by 1990.  It is currently about 45% of China’s and will decline 
further before starting to recover sometime in the next decade.  According to our mean 
projections, however, the catch-up process will take decades.  By 2050 India’s economy 
will be only 70% the size of China’s. 
 
                                                            
80 See Virmani (2005a) for the assumptions and more detailed discussion.  
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9  LESSONS 
In this section we summarise some of the lessons arising from the above analysis 
of the Chinese economy, viewed from the perspective of the Indian economy and India’s 
growth  experience.    These  lessons  therefore  implicitly  incorporate  an  India-China  
comparative perspective. 
9.1  Welfare or Growth Maximisation 
In  theory,  we  can  always  construct  a  set  of  assumptions  in  which  growth 
maximisation is identical to Social Welfare maximisation. The issue here is about the 
outcome of one or the other strategy in practice.    
A  growth  maximisation  strategy  is  clear,  focussed,  easy  to  understand  and 
implement.    Growth  maximisation  is  related  to  maximisation  of  value  added, 
sales/production, and long term employment at the firm and local government level.  It 
can therefore be relatively easily decentralised down to the lowest levels of government 
and implemented more efficiently even with low quality of governance. The public sector 
can also be integrated into this objective without creating dissonance.    
A  Welfare  maximisation  strategy  leads  to  multiple,  often  contradictory, 
objectives.    Though  rational  trade-offs  are  possible  in  theory  they  are  not  made  in 
practice and confusion and cross cutting actions are common.  This in turn leads to, (a) 
Detailed rules regulations and procedures for making choices – red tape and bureaucratic 
functioning. (b) Lack of accountability. It is easy to use one or more objectives (those 
that are hardest to measure)  as an excuse  for non-achievement of all others.   It also 
becomes easier to substitute ones personal objectives for the official ones by disguising 
the former as the latter.  (c) Given serious agency problems in governance, particularly in 
democratic systems, this provides an incentive for inefficiency and corruption. 
A growth maximisation strategy subject to reasonable social welfare constraints is 
superior  to  a  welfare  maximisation  strategy  implemented  through  subsidiary  growth 
objectives. The former is much more likely to take the largest number of citizens from 
low income to high-income category in the shortest possible time. The latter provides 
greater opportunity to those charged with implementation to increase their own welfare in  
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the name of the poor, consequently resulting in faster deterioration of governance ipso 
facto (other things equal). 
9.2  Institutions: Micro-Structures 
The importance of Institutions, defined as laws, rules and social conventions in 
long run growth is now widely accepted.  There are also studies showing the importance 
of Social capital.  Institutional micro-foundations or micro-structures, the organisations 
that implement these laws, rules and conventions have a critical role in economic growth 
(Virmani(2004a)). One of the lessons that we draw from our study of China and India’s 
growth  is,  “Do  not  destroy  institutions,  modify  and  adapt  them  to  your  development 
objectives.”  It is very easy to destroy institutions very difficult and time consuming to 
build them.   
The communist party government that came to power in China in the middle of 
the last century systematically destroyed what it considered ‘capitalist’ institutions and 
organisations.  But they also built communist party run organisations during the next fifty 
years.  The post Mao reformers have adapted the latter to fill the gap left by the former.  
China has shown that, (a) Even a communist/socialist institution the CCP can be used to 
nurture and support capitalist growth. (b) That communist controlled and managed co-
operatives,  which  in  the  Maoist  period  undertook  a  combination  of  governing  and 
production  functions  at  the  local  level  can  be  converted  into  competitive  production 
organisations (Town & village enterprises).
81 
The  destruction  of  centuries  old  social  and  market  institutions  (e.g.  private 
entrepreneurs) under Chairman Mao will, however, prove costly in the long run.  Such 
institutions  are  particularly  important  at  high  income  levels,  when  investors  from 
countries at the same (high income) level are unlikely to find it as advantageous as it is 
today  to  set  up  either  export  oriented  or  high  tech  operations  in  a  “Socialist  market 
economy” like China relative to a “Democratic market economy” like India.  
 
                                                            
81  Even ostensibly negative social institutions such as Caste organisations could have been used by India for productive purpose e.g. 
for promoting literacy or group credit.  
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9.3  FDI & Trade Liberalisation 
FDI  bundles  capital,  ‘technology’  and  entrepreneurship,  where  ‘technology’  is 
defined broadly to include information, knowledge, and skills relating to management, 
marketing and production.  The technology part of the bundle is much more important 
than capital for countries like India and China.  For China the entrepreneurial role of FDI 
has also been very important. 
FDI can be an extremely effective instrument for growth if it helps a country enter 
the global supply chain. A successful diaspora in a more advanced country is even more 
effective if it still has a connection to and an interest in the development of the country of 
origin.  The effectiveness of trade liberalisation in promoting growth is enhanced if it can 
be coupled with attraction of export oriented FDI.  FDI-export led growth has clearly 
worked in Asia, even if there are both positive and negative examples from other part of 
the World.  Democratic market economies are unlikely however, to be able to replicate 
the breakneck expansion of exports and FDI seen in China’s socialist market economy 
(and perhaps even in some “Nationalist Market economies”). 
Technological  change  (embodied  in  capital  goods  or  intermediates  or 
disembodied) is greatly facilitated by free imports and therefore import restrictions on 
these have added costs.  When bureaucrats decide what and from where capital goods and 
intermediate  goods should be imported by  entrepreneurs (QRs), innovation inevitably 
suffers.  
9.4  Labour Laws and Rules 
The  special  labour  laws  and  rules  for  Foreign  invested  enterprises  and  export 
producers in China has undoubtedly played a role in attracting export oriented FDI and 
increasing  labour  intensive  exports.    India  is  at  the  other  extreme  with  very  socially 
advanced labour laws and rules since 1950s (similar at that time to those in the richest 
countries).  These were implemented in a manner that introduced extreme rigidity and 
restriction in the organised labour market.  Rigid rules and bureaucratic procedures, have 
limited the inflow of export oriented FDI, discouraged the mass production of labour 
intensive exports (e.g. garments, toys and consumer electronics) and resulted in slower 
employment growth in the modern manufacturing sector.   India’s workers could obtain 
the  full  benefits  of  an  open  economy  if  these  laws  and  rules  provided  for  greater  
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flexibility.  There is no need for India (or any other country) to go to the other extreme 
typified by China. 
9.5  Competition and Public Monopoly 
Artificial  monopolies,  created  by  reserving  industries  for  the  government/public 
sector i.e. exclusion of private investment, have the most negative effect on efficiency 
and growth (as they have no redeeming merit).  Setting up of government production 
companies  per  say  is  not  obviously  bad,  creation  of  Government  monopolies  & 
oligopolies  clearly  is.  A  competitive  market  structure  is  much  more  important  than 
private  ownership  for  efficient  economic  growth.    Growth  maximising  and  profit 
maximising  monopolies,  whether  private  or  public  can  theoretically  be  equally  (in) 
efficient initially, but eventually succumb to X-inefficiency. Highly motivated political 
and administrative leadership (as in post-independence India or post Mao CCP rule) can 
even  be  more  effective  initially,  but  this  level  of  motivation  and  honesty  is  seldom 
sustained over long-periods. 
The  Public  sector  is,  however,  more  likely  to  be  characterised  by  multiple  and 
incompatible  objectives  and  agency  problems.    This  is  primarily  responsible  for  the 
negative effect of public ownership. Soft budget constraints, poor selection of managers 
and lack of incentives arise in a context in which everyone and no one owns the firm.  
Public monopoly multiplies these problems.   A monopoly/oligopoly structure coupled 
with social objectives (even secondary ones) and agency problems distort incentives for 
managers and can be disastrous for efficient growth. This applies in banking as much as 
in manufacturing. 
The  threat  of  imports  (even  where  imports  are  low)  is  the  greatest  competitive 
force.  In general free access to imports (i.e. no bans or QRs) is the simplest way to 
ensure competition, a method that is available to economies of all sizes.  Only large 
economies have the luxury of limiting themselves to domestic competition, but even in 
their  case  there  will  always  be  some  products  for  which  market  size  and  minimum 
economic scale do not permit much competition.  
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9.6  High-Risk, High Return Policies 
India invested well ahead of demand in higher education in the 1960s just as 
China  is  doing  in  infrastructure  since  mid  1990.    In  India’s  case  there  was  a  clear 
imbalance between investment in basic education relative to higher education.  In China’s 
case there is an imbalance between private and public consumption relative to public 
investment.  In hindsight India’s higher education strategy appears to have been highly 
successful (vide IT and other service exports).   
The supply of infrastructure in ASEAN high growth economies generally lagged 
demand for it, in complete contrast to China, which is building well ahead of demand (8 
lane  highways  where  4  lanes  would  be  sufficient).  China’s  infrastructure  investment 
strategy appears, so far, to be equally successful.  India’s investment could have been 
totally wasted if globalisation did not provide a channel of migration and utilisation of 
skills for which there was no demand in India.  China’s investment in rich country style 
infrastructure could still be wasted if growth slows dramatically.  Both are therefore high-
risk  high-return  policies.    Large  countries  like  India  and  China  can  have  diversified 
portfolio of policies, including a few high risk, high return ones.  Small, poor countries 
should be extremely cautious in adopting any such strategy. 
9.7  Democracy vs. Dictatorship 
Oligarchies such as Communist party ruled China or dictatorial democracies such 
as  Singapore,  post-war  Japan  and  S.  Korea,  appear  to  have  been  more  successful  in 
organising a country to develop from low-income to high-income category.  They also 
have  an  advantage  in  mass  production  and  large-scale  organised  activity  including 
construction.  The disadvantages of dictatorship include the stamping out of diversity 
(language, culture, religion) and dissent. 
 “Democratic  market  economies”  like  India  appear  to  be  more  successful  at 
generating entrepreneurship, independent thinking and individual responsibility, that is an 
advantage in the service sector.  Even the humblest service provider has greater scope for 
individual  initiative  than  an  assembly  line  worker  and  these  characteristics  are  more 
important in services than in modern manufacturing. These skills are also advantageous 
in moving from the bottom to the top of the high-income category.  India, with its great 
diversity,  coupled  with  English  language  facility  has  an  additional  advantage  in  the  
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globalised 21
st century.   Most managers & professionals have  worked  with others of 
different  Ethnicity,  religion,  native  language  etc.  and  can  therefore  work  easily  with 
people of any nationality or background. 
There  is  however  a  simultaneity  problem  in  comparing  dictatorship  with 
democracy.  The former group seem to have adopted a growth maximising strategy and 
the latter group a Welfare maximising one.  Would a swapping of objectives make the 
latter more successful even in the low & middle income range? 
9.8  Governance 
The Problem of Governance is not the same as the problem of financial corruption. 
Even though the latter is associated with the former it is a very small sub-set of the 
governance problem.  Mental corruption (intentions, objectives and motivation) is much 
more important than financial corruption (bribery). The governance problem is at it’s a 
core a problem of performance.  Does the government (its leaders, bureaucrats) perform 
the  functions  that  are  its  reasons  for  existence  or  are  these  secondary/tertiary  to  the 
objective of self aggrandisement.  For instance in Urban areas does the government carry 
out effective urban planning, provide clean drinking water, sewage and sanitation, roads, 
street lights and parks so that it grows in an efficient and organic manner.  Does the 
government  build  the  national  and  intra-state  highways  necessary  for  commerce  to 
flourish? 
 One of the lessons from China is that this is the most critical issue, not whether the 
government is spotlessly clean.  The different levels of government in China are not less 
corrupt than in India, but China’s government(s) supplies Public Goods and Quasi-public 
goods and services, while the Indian government (s) has (have) failed to do so to the level 
and quality that can reasonably be expected in a low income country.  The second related 
lesson is that the Chinese government(s) have their eyes firmly focussed on the goal, the 
production and supply of these public goods (appropriate to each level of government).  
The  means  are  of  secondary  importance.    Pragmatism  is  essential  for  achieving  fast 
supply  growth;  all  necessary  means  (privatisation,  private-public  partnership),  are 
adopted to fulfil the goals and objectives.  In India the goals can be forgotten for years in 
debates  of  the  best  means  for  achieving  them  as  it  is  often  more  important  to  win  
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elections/get power than to fulfil the goals and objectives of the entity over which you 
have power. 
10 CONCLUSION: FDI-EXPORT LED GROWTH 
Many eminent scholars have studied China’s phenomenal growth rate and come 
to the conclusion that it has basically adopted the ‘East Asian model of growth.’  An 
essential element of this model is “export led growth.”  Though the approach to growth 
among  these  countries  has  common  elements  there  is  also  a  great  deal  of  variation.  
Singapore for instance lacked domestic capitalists and initially depended heavily on FDI 
as a source of capital, technology and entrepreneurship.  Though the role of the State in 
investment gradually expanded, the importance  of FDI is still very high, perhaps the 
highest among Asian countries.  Singapore therefore followed an FDI-export led growth 
model rather than an export-led one.  China, for its own political reasons and socio-
economic  dynamics,  shares  with  Singapore  this  significantly  greater  emphasis  and 
dependence on FDI as a source of entrepreneurship, technology and competitive growth.  
During  the  eighties  and  early  nineties  it  moved  gradually  from  an  export-led  growth 
strategy to an FDI-export led growth one.  This strategy and the associated policies ( 
whatever their short term costs and long term risks), have been a very important engine of 
growth in China during the last 25 years. 
The  greatest  difference  between  China  and  the  other  countries  of  E  Asia  that 
followed the East Asian Model was that at the start of reforms China was a Marxist 
‘Socialist’ State ruled by a Leninist Communist Party.  Most of the East Asian States in 
their early years of reform/growth could perhaps be classified as Authoritarian (one man 
or one party) Democracies.  There is a fundamental difference between the two.  The 
socialist state (communist party) owns all the means of production, controls all factors 
and manages all production and sale of goods and services.  China’s reforms have moved 
the economy from Socialist economy to a “Socialist Market” economy with a mix of old 
‘socialist’ and new ‘market’ elements. The ‘socialist’ control of China’s domestic assets 
(i.e. excluding FDI) was perhaps still around 95%, at the beginning of the century. 
As  is  well  known,  the  market  has  two  key  elements:    Individuals  and 
organisations that supply and demand a good and a mechanism for determining prices by 
matching total supply and demand that good. The efficiency and productivity depends on  
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the behaviour of the supplier (objectives, incentives and skills) and the structure of the 
market  (competition).    The  external  elements  of  the  market  are  well  understood 
technically and relatively easy to institute.  For instance ‘Dual’ pricing and distribution 
systems  were  used  as  an  intermediates  step  in  moving  agricultural  goods  from  a 
rationed/controlled rationed controlled system to a market based one in India during the 
mid-sixties.    In  the  1970s  such  transitional  arrangements  were  applied  in  India  to 
controlled  manufactured  goods  well  before  the  reforms  in  China.    It  is  much  more 
difficult  to  design,  introduce  and  operationalise  systems  of  management  in  which 
government owns and controls virtually all the capital/assets. 
At the start of reforms  in late 1970s China had an administrative system that 
combined a high level of centralisation of policy making with a relatively decentralised 
system of governance and production.   The lowest level of government the township and 
villages had a level of autonomy that was greater than in democratic India with a free and 
competitive agriculture  sector.  Similarly the level of production decentralisation was 
much greater than in the USSR or Eastern Europe, partly due the disastorous Maoist 
experiments in decentralising manufacturing of steel and other capital intensive goods to 
the  local  level.    These  experiments  facilitated  the  creation  of  (party  controlled) 
organisations and  managers with experience of producing goods and services at the local 
level.   With the creation of output markets these organisation formed the nucleus of the 
Town and Village enterprises (TVEs), which played a vital role in the success of market 
reforms  during  the  1980s.    Governance  decentralisation  also  facilitated  the  closer 
matching of the objectives and incentives of local govts and TVEs than was possible at 
the provincial and national levels. 
China’s economic growth has been driven by a highly motivated communist party 
(CCP)  leadership  that  had  fast  growth  and  income  catch-up  with  richer/advanced 
countries  as  its  primary  objective.    This  objective  was  successfully  diffused  and 
decentralised to the lowest level of government the towns and villages, to a degree that 
was perhaps unmatched even by Japan and S. Korea that had similar objectives in the 
corresponding point in their development.
82  This objective did not necessarily exist from 
the beginning of the reforms in 1977 or 1978, when the focus was on correcting the 
                                                            
82 Singapore also had similar objectives, but decentralization is not an issue in a city state.  
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abysmal policies of the past decade that had put the economy well below its ‘normal’ 
trajectory.  In 1975 China’s GDP at PPP was about 81% of India’s and its per capita GDP 
at PPP 54% of India’s.  Market reforms in agriculture led to a growth spurt in this sector.  
Renewed interest in exports to generate foreign exchange for imports helped support this 
growth and helped spread growth to the other sectors. The growth spurt between the mid-
1970s and early 1980s represented normalisation of agriculture and foreign trade (export 
thrust) policy from a self-destructive Maoist extreme.  As a consequence, the GDP gap 
with India had been closed by 1982-83.
83 
Product market and managerial reforms then shifted to manufacturing sector and 
the policy focus shifted to an Export led growth strategy.  This evolved into an FDI-
export led strategy.  The policy could be described as a combination of attracting FDI at 
any cost and promoting exports at any cost.  The public ownership of capital assets and 
land has provided the profits that were used to push up public investment and provide the 
subsidies needed to maintain incredibly high rates of export and FDI growth.  The output 
of  this  investment  was  absorbed  by  further  investment,  consumer  demand  expressed 
through output markets and exports. 
Though  economic  policy  has  constantly  evolved  to  expand  the  scope  of  the 
market and to develop market institutions a large area of socialist inefficiency remains.  
The  strengths  and  weakness  of  socialist  ownership  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  
Government ownership of most domestic assets eliminates the need for high taxes that 
create  distortions  and  disincentives  for  private  entrepreneurs.    In  combination  with 
absolute control of individual saving it allows high rates of public investment and high 
levels of subsidies to attract FDI and push capital intensive exports.  The other side of the 
coin is that rates of return to public capital have progressively declined and will continue 
to  decline  as  long  as  centralised  social  ownership  and  control  (of  national  and  large 
provincial SOEs) is maintained.   At some point therefore both the amount of subsidy and 
the  rate  of  public  investment  must  fall,  leading  to  a  lower  growth  rate.    Though  in 
principle policy reform that expands the scope of the (genuine & more efficient) private 
sector can help maintain growth, this appears unlikely to happen at a speed that will keep 
the rate of growth from declining albeit gradually. 
                                                            
83 It took another decade to close the income gap.  
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